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INTRODUCTION 
A core failing of today’s administrative state and modern administrative law 
scholarship is the lack of imagination as to how agencies should operate. On the 
conventional telling, public agencies follow specific grants of regulatory 
authority, use the traditional tools of notice-and-comment rulemaking and 
adjudication, and are checked by judicial review. In reality, however, effective 
administration depends on entrepreneurial leadership that can spearhead policy 
experimentation and trial-and-error problem-solving, including the development 
of regulatory programs that use non-traditional tools. 
Entrepreneurial administration takes place both at public agencies and private 
entities, each of which can address regulatory challenges and earn regulatory 
authority as a result. Consider, for example, that Energy Star, a successful 
program that has encouraged the manufacture and sale of energy efficient 
appliances, is developed and overseen by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”).1 After the EPA established the program, Congress codified it and, 
eventually, other countries followed suit.2 By contrast, the successful and 
complementary program encouraging the construction of energy efficient 
buildings, the well-respected Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(“LEED”) standard, was developed and is overseen by a private organization.3 
After it was developed, a number of governmental authorities endorsed it and 
 
1 Energy Star, Origins & Missions, ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm 
?c=about.ab_index%20 [https://perma.cc/WJF7-ALKG] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
2 The EPA developed the program without any specific congressional mandate to do so; 
in creating the program, it invoked a broad exhortation from the Clean Act Amendments of 
1990. Id. (“Section 103(g) of the Clean Air Act directs the Administrator to ‘conduct a basic 
engineering research and technology program to develop, evaluate, and demonstrate non–
regulatory strategies and technologies for reducing air pollution.’”). Although the EPA 
initially developed this program, it later enlisted the Department of Energy (“DOE”) as a 
partner to administer the program. Id. In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress codified 
the program. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6294a (2012) (establishing 
Energy Star as “a voluntary program to identify and promote energy-efficient products and 
buildings . . . .”). 
3 See Join Our Community, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, https://new.usgbc.org/join 
[https://perma.cc/9MAJ-G48P] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
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have encouraged LEED-certified construction projects with both carrots4 and 
sticks.5 Significantly, although neither the Energy Star program nor the LEED 
standard were originally anticipated by any regulatory statute, both have had 
tremendous impacts. 
The Energy Star and LEED case studies exemplify the sort of innovative 
regulatory strategies taking root in the modern administrative state.6 Despite the 
importance of entrepreneurial administration in practice, scholars have failed to 
examine the role of entrepreneurial leadership in spurring policy innovation and 
earning regulatory authority for an agency (or private entity).7 This oversight is 
most unfortunate in the case of technologically developing fields where 
experimental regulatory strategies—as opposed to traditional notice-and-
comment rulemaking or adjudication—are often essential.8 In short, 
administrative law needs an account of agency action that explains why 
entrepreneurial leadership matters in government and how agencies should 
operate.9 
 
4 See, e.g., Good to Know: Green Building Incentive Strategies, U.S. GREEN BLDG. 
COUNCIL, https://www.usgbc.org/articles/good-know-green-building-incentive-strategies-0 
[https://perma.cc/R59U-CTPE] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
5 See infra note 266 and accompanying text. 
6 In viewing programs like Energy Star as a form of “regulation,” I am using the term in 
its broader sense. See CARY COGLIANESE, THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., 
MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF REGULATION AND 
REGULATORY POLICY 9 (2012), https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/1_coglianese% 
20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/T54V-M28D] (“[R]egulation seeks to change behaviour in order 
to produce desired outcomes.”). 
7 Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 903 (2009) 
(“Given legal scholars’ long-standing interest in and sensitivity to institutions, it is ironic that 
this set of questions about institutions is only now starting to penetrate the thinking of those 
of us in law who study agencies and their operation.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative 
Law, Public Administration, and the Administrative Conference of the United States, 83 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1518-19 (2015) (noting administrative law’s disconnect from actual 
government practices); Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden 
Side of Administrative Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 675, 676 (2009) (calling for more careful 
scrutiny as to how agencies operate in practice). 
8 Some scholars have noted the limits of notice-and-comment rulemaking and 
adjudication. E.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1490 (2005) (“[N]otice-and-comment rulemaking is 
ossifying, and formal adjudication is burdensome.”). Similarly, a number of scholars have 
noted the rise of alternative models of regulation to adapt to accelerating technological change 
and globalization. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Multi-Interest Self-Governance Through Global 
Product Certification Programs, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS? SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN 
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 261, 261 (Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg & Gerd 
Winter eds., 2007); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 448 (2003). 
9 For one recent alternative account, see Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians 
and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. 
  
2014 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:2011 
 
This Article explains that the conventional view of agency behavior—
following the specific direction of Congress or the President and using notice-
and-comment rulemaking or adjudication processes—does not capture how 
public agencies and private entities develop innovative regulatory strategies and 
earn regulatory authority as a result. In particular, this Article explains how 
governmental agencies like the EPA and private entities like the United States 
Green Building Council (“USGBC”) (which oversees the LEED standard) 
depend on entrepreneurial leadership to develop experimental regulatory 
strategies. It also explains how, in the wake of such experiments, legislative 
bodies have the opportunity to evaluate regulatory innovations in practice before 
deciding whether to embrace, revise, reject, or merely tolerate them. To be sure, 
such experimental strategies are not always preferable to traditional 
administrative rulemaking and adjudication, but considering experimental 
strategies and evaluating whether they would be more effective than traditional 
regulatory approaches is. 
Legal scholarship on experimental regulation is well-developed in the context 
of states serving as laboratories of democracy.10 Scholars have not, however, 
discussed the significant role that federal agencies and private bodies can play 
in experimenting with regulatory strategies in advance of congressional action.11 
Scholars have also failed to examine the role of entrepreneurial leadership in 
developing successful experiments. This Article does just that, highlighting the 
importance of entrepreneurial leadership in government, discussing a number of 
 
REV. 227, 232-34, 243, 266 (2016) (challenging conventional narrative and explaining 
interactive dynamic of how agencies, the President, Congress, and civil society check one 
another’s authority and collaborate with one another). 
10 The phrase, of course, comes from Justice Louis Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co. 
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve 
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”). For a discussion of the use of state agencies to experiment within federal 
regulatory regimes, see Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for 
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668-73 (2001). Indeed, as Robert Ahdieh 
points out, a core value of “intersystem[] regulation” (which can include international entities) 
is the encouragement of regulatory innovation. Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 
CONN. L. REV. 863, 892 (2006). 
11 To be sure, some commentators have called for changes to the administrative state to 
allow for experimental regulations. E.g., Sofia Ranchordas, Innovation Experimentalism in 
the Age of the Sharing Economy, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 871, 875 (2015) (proposing new 
model for experimental regulations); Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69 
VAND. L. REV. 401, 430 (2016) (calling for new approach to enabling experiments using 
traditional administrative law tools); see also Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive 
Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 182 (2014) (suggesting how timing rules and 
alternative enforcement mechanisms can be used to manage experimental regulatory 
strategies). 
  
2017] ENTREPRENEURIAL ADMINISTRATION 2015 
 
emerging regulatory experiments, and suggesting how Congress should evaluate 
such experiments. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the traditional model of 
regulation and the emerging alternative models of agency action through co-
regulation, developing best practices through convening, and encouraging 
private regulation. In so doing, it underscores that entrepreneurial leadership and 
a culture of experimentation and trial-and-error learning is essential to 
developing the best solution. Part II discusses the relevant criteria for evaluating 
such experiments and examines potential objections to the earned regulatory 
authority model. Part III discusses four case studies of experimental regulatory 
strategies: (1) the USGBC’s development of the LEED standard; (2) the Federal 
Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) oversight of information privacy and data security 
practices; (3) the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (“NIST”) 
development of a strategy for cybersecurity readiness; and (4) the Department 
of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) oversight of electronic health records. 
In all of these cases, the private body or federal agency acted to oversee an 
emerging technology or issue (often in advance of explicit congressional 
direction and guidance), allowing Congress to observe the strategy in action and 
evaluate it after the fact. Part IV examines the concept of policy 
entrepreneurship, explaining both the barriers and opportunities it faces in the 
modern administrative state. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL AND EMERGING REALITIES 
The traditional model of regulation relies on notice-and-comment rulemaking 
and agency adjudication.12 Under this model, the output—the starting point for 
traditional administrative law analysis—is generally a form of positive law 
developed and enforced by a government agency through traditional tools 
(rulemaking or adjudication).13 As Professors Charles Sabel and William Simon 
have observed, this model, “pejoratively called command and control, is 
identified with rule-bound bureaucracy and deference to ineffable expertise.”14 
The traditional model can be depicted neatly as a hierarchy.15 Congress sets a 
specific policy direction and empowers an administrative agency to implement 
that policy. The agency, in turn, uses either its rulemaking or adjudication 
authority to implement that direction. Finally, owing to the agency’s expertise 
and congressional authorization, courts review the agency’s action with 
deference. 
 
12 See Jason Solomon, Book Review Essay, Law and Governance in the 21st Century 
Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819, 821-22 (2008). 
13 See id. 
14 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the 
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 54 (2011). 
15 See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 12, at 820. 
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Driven by technological changes and globalization, regulatory agencies 
increasingly are looking to alternative regulatory strategies, many of which fit 
under the “[N]ew [G]overnance” label.16 In some cases, innovative regulators 
experiment with new approaches to address emerging issues and fill gaps in the 
existing regulatory regime. In other cases, an agency might experiment with a 
co-regulatory strategy (where the agency integrates its authority with private 
sector efforts); exercise its authority in creative ways, such as developing best 
practices through convenings; or rely on private regulation. In that last category, 
as is the case with Energy Star, the government agency (or private entity, for 
that matter) can certify compliance with best practices, thereby sharing valuable 
information with the public and shaping norms of behavior.17 In each of the 
above examples, the regulatory agency acts not within a hierarchy, but within a 
network.18 
 
16 Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some 
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 496 (2004) (“New 
Governance is not a single model, but a loosely related family of alternative approaches to 
governance, each advanced as a corrective to the perceived pathologies of conventional forms 
of regulation.”); Solomon, supra note 12, at 823 (categorizing New Governance strategies as 
ones where “public and private actors interact in increasingly complex and collaborative ways 
to address problems of public policy”); see also Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, 
Experimental Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 169, 169 (David 
Levi-Faur ed., 2012) (“[E]xperimentalist governance is a recursive process of provisional 
goal-setting and revision based on learning from the comparison of alternative approaches to 
advancing them in different contexts.”). Both New Governance and experimental governance 
follow in the intellectual tradition of Professors Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite’s landmark 
work in the field. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992) (“[B]y 
working more creatively with the interplay between private and public regulation, government 
and citizens can design better policy solutions.”). 
17 Professor Michael Livermore, invoking the Energy Star model, calls the combination of 
information sharing and norm entrepreneurship “preference-directed regulation.” Michael A. 
Livermore, Reviving Environmental Protection: Preference-Directed Regulation and 
Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 326-32 (2007) (describing way that 
information provided and norms established by EPA’s Energy Star program have altered 
consumer preferences). 
18 Sabel & Zeitlin use the concept of “network governance” to describe an experimentalist 
approach, explaining that it captures the approach of a “reciprocal redefinition of ends and 
means through an iterated, multi-level cycle of provisional goal-setting and revision.” Sabel 
& Zeitlin, supra note 16, at 175. In a different piece with Simon, Sabel suggested that this 
model of governance is “‘networked’ and ‘multilevel,’” explaining that it uses 
“decisionmaking processes that are neither hierarchical nor closed and that permit persons of 
different ranks, units, and even organizations to collaborate as circumstances demand.” 
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1019 (2004). 
  
2017] ENTREPRENEURIAL ADMINISTRATION 2017 
 
The traditional, hierarchical model follows a familiar, step-wise approach to 
regulation.19 The first step is establishing a standard of conduct.20 The second 
step is implementing that standard of conduct, generally through a monitoring 
regime.21 The final step is enforcement, in which parties are sanctioned for any 
failures to comply with the rules.22 This model of regulatory action still holds 
strong in some areas, but it is no longer—and should not be—the exclusive 
strategy for addressing emerging policy issues. 
In the emerging, networked environment, regulatory agencies find themselves 
with a range of options and tools for developing standards of conduct, 
monitoring behavior in the marketplace, and enforcing or encouraging 
compliance. The conversation around such emerging solutions has taken a 
number of forms, sometimes under the headings of “responsive regulation,” 
“experimentalism,” or “New Governance.” However framed, there is a pressing 
need for more adaptable approaches that can operate effectively in 
technologically changing environments or in fields where the circumstances 
differ across geographic (or other) contexts.23 To address emerging challenges, 
regulatory agencies will increasingly be called upon to experiment with non-
traditional regulatory strategies, requiring legislatures to monitor and evaluate 
the effectiveness of innovative regulatory initiatives after the fact. 
A. The Limits of the Traditional Regulatory Approach 
The traditional model of regulation is coming under strain in the face of 
increasing globalization and technological change.24 Consider, for example, the 
traditional model of drug and medical device approval used by the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”). The legacy model of regulation envisioned the 
FDA reviewing a drug and making an up-or-down decision on whether to 
approve the marketing of the drug.25 By putting all of the pressure on the front 
 
19 For a discussion of these steps, see Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private 
Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 291, 299-300 (2014) (explaining that there are 
three aspects of regulation: rule creation, rule implementation, and enforcement). 
20 See id. at 299. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See J.B. Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk in Legal Systems, 89 IND. L.J. 559, 600 (2014) 
(“[T]he conventional regulatory state is not designed for agencies to move quickly and 
adaptively.”). 
24 FTC Chairwoman Maureen Ohlhausen made the point colorfully, stating that, for 
rapidly evolving, unregulated industries, “yesterday’s comfortable regulatory bed can quickly 
become a torture rack for tomorrow’s technologies.” Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Procrustean 
Problem with Prescriptive Regulation, 23 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 2 (2014); see also 
Roger G. Noll, Impediments to Innovation in Legal Infrastructure, 8 I/S 62, 62 (2012) 
(“[A]ccelerated technological progress and globalization of economic relationships have 
made standard-form solutions to legal problems increasingly inefficient . . . .”). 
25 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 14, at 86. 
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end (ex ante), the legacy model creates two sets of challenges: (1) the pre-
approval process takes a long time, costs a lot of money, and, in some cases, 
unnecessarily delays access to potentially beneficial drugs; and (2) the lack of a 
post-approval review process allows drugs to “be marketed despite evidence that 
they were doing unanticipated harm.”26 Unfortunately, the second type of 
error—a lack of responsiveness to on-the-ground realities—reinforces the first 
type of error, creating more pressure on the FDA to withhold approval until it 
satisfies itself that the relevant drug or device will not cause harm.27 
Congress is well aware of the limits of traditional ex ante regulation. In the 
food and drug arena, it has worked to update the FDA’s model of regulation. In 
the Food and Drug Administration Amendments of 2007, for example, Congress 
gave the FDA increased flexibility to approve drugs and require ongoing 
research as to how the drugs work, called for an improved Adverse Event Report 
System at the agency, and mandated a framework for monitoring drug efficacy 
in practice.28 More recently, the FDA established fast-tracks for approving drugs 
and medical devices that promise life-saving breakthroughs.29 As the FDA 
explained with respect to the medical device review process, “[r]educing 
premarket data requirements while increasing postmarket requirements for 
devices subject to a [Pre-Market Approval], when appropriate, can assist the 
FDA in making medical devices available to patients sooner than if following 
the traditional premarket review pathway.”30 
 
26 Id. 
27 For another example of the limits of the traditional model and its principal focus on ex 
ante regulation, consider the case of wireless spectrum regulation. See, e.g., J. PIERRE DE VRIES 
& PHILIP J. WEISER, UNLOCKING SPECTRUM VALUE THROUGH IMPROVED ALLOCATION, 
ASSIGNMENT, AND ADJUDICATION OF SPECTRUM RIGHTS 5-6 (2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/THP_DeVriesWeiserDiscPaper.pd 
f [https://perma.cc/SY49-4MGA] (advocating for implementation of specific reforms in 
spectrum regulation to reduce time-consuming regulatory processes); Philip J. Weiser & Dale 
Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of Property Rights, 15 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 549, 551-52 (2008) (arguing that, by continuing to use “command and control” model 
of spectrum regulation, FCC has ignored need for regulatory reform). 
28 Sabel & Simon, supra note 14, at 87. In so doing, Congress opted to adhere to the 
traditional model, rather than take a fundamental reform along the lines urged by Richard 
Epstein. See Richard A. Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Voluntary Organizations Should 
Regulate the Use of Cancer Drugs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2009) (advocating model where 
FDA acted only to certify drugs as safe, allowing for more experimentation in market with 
novel cures). 
29 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EXPEDITED ACCESS FOR PREMARKET APPROVAL AND DE 
NOVO MEDICAL DEVICES INTENDED FOR UNMET MEDICAL NEED FOR LIFE THREATENING OR 
IRREVERSIBLY DEBILITATING DISEASES OR CONDITIONS 4 (2015), http://www.fda.gov/ucm/ 
groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-meddev-gen/documents/document/ucm393978.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A87Z-CV3D]. 
30 Id. at 5. 
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This Article, while sympathetic to the need to reform existing regulatory 
structures, does not focus on this issue.31 Rather, it explains how considerable 
flexibility for a range of alternative options exists within current structures and 
is already being used by agencies and private entities to great effect. As such, 
this Article describes the underappreciated model of earned regulatory authority, 
calls for a more self-conscious use of this model, and explains how agencies can 
spearhead and implement this model successfully through entrepreneurial 
leadership and a culture of trial-and-error problem solving.32 
The role of a more imaginative approach to regulation relates back to the 
“responsive regulation” movement led by Ayres and Braithwaite. On their 
account, regulatory strategies can be conceptualized as an “enforcement 
pyramid,” with “persuasion” on the bottom and “license revocation” at the top 
(as the regulatory equivalent of the death penalty for a regulated firm).33 In all 
cases, a responsive regulation approach emphasizes dialogue and engagement 
around the impact of regulatory efforts in practice.34 In so doing, it underscores 
that regulators need not always use their traditional tools (notice-and-comment 
rulemaking and adjudication). Rather than reflexively adopting traditional 
approaches, regulatory agencies can (1) embrace and oversee self-regulation 
(enforced self-regulation or co-regulation), (2) convene stakeholders to develop 
best practices, or (3) persuade parties to develop private regulatory initiatives. 
The next three Sections discuss each strategy in turn. 
 
31 For one thoughtful such discussion, see J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive 
Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. SCI. & TECH. 21, 25 (2005) (“There is almost 
universal agreement that problems of this sort demand new approaches to regulation.”). See 
also Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 14 (2014) (proposing changes to traditional structure of 
administrative law to allow for agencies to use adaptive management model); David Zaring, 
Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 193 (2010) (explaining how Treasury 
Department operates free of traditional administrative law constraints in practice, enabling it 
to use its authority more nimbly and flexibly than other agencies). 
32 In the European Union, for example, there is an effort underway to promote 
experimental strategies of governance. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, REPORT FROM THE 
COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE 36 (2003), http://ec.europa.eu/governance/docs/ 
comm_rapport_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KLM-FAA4]. 
33 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 16, at 35. Later, Braithwaite developed the 
complementary concept of the “strengths-based pyramid” ranging from providing education 
and persuasion around a valued concept to a singular award for excellent achievement, with 
certification for best practice somewhere in the middle. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., 
REGULATING AGED CARE: RITUALISM AND THE NEW PYRAMID 319 (2007). For an overall 
discussion of Braithwaite’s thinking, see generally John Braithwaite, Fasken Lecture, The 
Essence of Responsive Regulation, 44 U.B.C. L. REV. 475 (2011). 
34 See Braithwaite, supra note 33, at 476. 
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B. The Promise of Co-Regulation 
Even when using its traditional authority, an agency can operate more nimbly 
and effectively by integrating its efforts with private bodies who have expertise 
in the field. Where that integration involves the explicit embrace, oversight, and 
enforcement of actions by private bodies, the model of regulation is aptly 
described as “co-regulation.”35 For a successful use of co-regulation, consider 
the FCC’s use of frequency coordinators to assign rights to use the wireless 
spectrum. As I have explained previously: 
One notable self-regulatory program that the FCC has overseen is the use 
of frequency coordinators, which manage voluntary cooperation in the use 
of point-to-point microwave links and private land mobile radio systems. 
In that context, the coordinator evaluates requests for new licenses and 
certifies that such new licenses will not cause undue interference to 
established users. Consequently, while the FCC is the authority that grants 
or denies licenses as a formal matter, it routinely relies on and defers to the 
judgment of the frequency coordinator. This deference to the frequency 
coordinator facilitates cooperation around the use of the relevant licenses.36 
The importance of this co-regulation model is that the FCC’s delegation of 
authority enables practical problem-solving on the ground by the frequency 
coordinator. As Dale Hatfield, a former Chief Engineer at the FCC, explained, 
this system works because it encourages the local engineers to “sit down 
together, solve these problems, and say let’s figure out how to do it,” limiting 
the need for the FCC to use its backstop authority.37 
The FTC’s partnership with the Better Business Bureau’s National 
Advertising Division (“NAD”) operates in a functionally similar fashion to the 
FCC’s use of frequency coordinators.38 Notably, the NAD has developed an 
 
35 For discussions about co-regulation, see Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet 
Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 553 (2009) (“[T]he concept of co-regulation involves 
industry self-policing through an independent and credible body subject to government 
accountability and oversight.”); OFFICE OF COMMC’N, IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE 
REGULATORY SOLUTIONS: PRINCIPLES FOR ANALYSING SELF- AND CO-REGULATION 4 (2008) 
(U.K.), http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/coregulation/statement/state 
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VVZ-9W5H] (summarizing Office of Communication’s method 
for determining whether co-regulation is appropriate to achieve specific regulatory 
objectives). 
36 Weiser, supra note 35, at 555-56. 
37 Id. at 555. 
38 Formally, the FTC does not empower the NAD in the identical fashion as the FCC does 
for frequency coordinators in that it does not specifically call for participation in this body 
before bringing a matter to the FTC. As a practical matter, however, the FTC encourages the 
use of the NAD. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Self-Regulation and Antitrust, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Feb. 18, 1998), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/02/self-regulation-
and-antitrust [https://perma.cc/FKC7-237M] (praising NAD as effective model of self-
regulation). 
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effective model of dispute resolution around misleading advertising issues, 
deciding an array of issues and referring cases, where necessary and appropriate, 
to the FTC.39 Because the NAD has developed such a trusted program, FTC 
leaders have praised its work and relied on it to carry the laboring oar in this 
area,40 leaving the FTC’s residual authority as a backstop. In particular, the NAD 
refers cases to the FTC where a party refuses to participate in its process or 
comply with a decision.41 
Learning from the NAD model, the European Union is working with the 
European Advertising Standards Alliance to develop a similar approach to 
overseeing false advertising claims.42 In this case, however, the governmental 
authority is actively involved in developing and supporting this body rather than 
integrating its work after the body developed on its own.43 In short, government 
can either embrace existing bodies as part of a co-regulation strategy or stimulate 
and steer the development of new ones. 
C. The Role of Best Practices and Agency Convened Efforts 
For many regulatory agencies, the opportunity to act as a “convenor,” to 
develop best practices, and to create “soft law” or norms is an important part of 
their mission. As former FTC Chair Bill Kovacic explained with regard to the 
FTC, “Congress gave the FTC capacity to serve as a convenor—to engage in a 
diverse array of activities that facilitate norms development,” including “what 
we now call ‘soft law’ measures (e.g., self-regulatory standards, proposed 
guidelines).”44 In particular, Congress specifically authorized the FTC to collect 
information and develop reports on topics not immediately related to cases or 
regulatory matters before the Commission.45 In Kovacic’s view, the FTC has 
used its convening authority effectively, “improv[ing] understanding, build[ing] 
consensus, and supply[ing] focal points for norms development” through 
thoughtful reports that distill key issues.46 
 
39 Weiser, supra note 35, at 553. 
40 John E. Villafranco & Katherine E. Riley, So You Want to Self-Regulate? The National 
Advertising Division as Standard Bearer, 27 ANTITRUST 79, 79 (2013). 
41 Id. 
42 Colin Scott, Fabrizio Cafaggi & Linda Senden, The Conceptual and Constitutional 
Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 8-9 (2011). 
43 See id. 
44 William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission as Convenor: Developing 
Regulatory Policy Norms Without Litigation or Rulemaking, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 17, 19-20 
(2015). 
45 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 49 (2012); see Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful 
Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 176 (2005) (“A farsighted feature of Congress’s 
institutional design is that it gave the FTC flexible tools to perform the necessary research and 
development.”). 
46 Kovacic, supra note 44, at 28. 
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For a range of agencies, the role of developing and championing best practices 
is on the rise,47 reflecting a number of trends. First, many agencies find 
themselves without sufficient authority to promulgate binding rules as new 
technologies emerge. Second, even where an agency may have formal authority, 
it might be reluctant to use it in the face of an emerging technology where it 
needs to act more quickly than formal notice-and-comment rulemaking allows. 
Third, the agency may lack sufficient confidence that a prescriptive rule is 
warranted and thus leaves open a range of options, merely narrowing the field 
of possibilities and pointing entities in the right direction.48 
To develop best practices effectively, an agency must invest significant 
resources in the enterprise. Stated generally, this effort involves “horizontal 
modeling rather than hierarchical direction” and is “a method of regulation in 
which central administrators provide advice and disseminate information, 
instead of mandating a one-size-fits-all regulatory scheme.”49 In an increasing 
number of cases, best practices focus not only on U.S. firms, but also those 
across the world, requiring that the regulatory agency coordinate its international 
counterparts.50 Moreover, to develop emerging best practices, it is important that 
agency staff take the time to learn the details of “the regulated entities first-hand, 
develop a strong sense of emerging processes, and . . . [share] knowledge of 
these processes with staff at other locations.”51 
Where an agency (or a private entity) identifies and disseminates a best 
practice, it acts as a “norm entrepreneur.”52 As discussed in Part III, the FTC has 
performed this role in the online privacy and data security contexts, articulating 
and recommending a set of best practices.53 One virtue of this role—like soft 
law more generally—is that it may well make the adoption of more formal 
regulation less necessary.54 To the extent that the articulation of the relevant 
 
47 David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 295 (2006) (“Although best-
practice rulemaking has been largely ignored by the legal literature, regulation through best 
practices has increased seven-fold in the past ten years . . . .”). 
48 Id. at 324 (citing BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 2 
(2004)) (noting value of providing a limited set of options). 
49 Id. at 297. 
50 See Zaring, supra note 47, at 299. 
51 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 354 (1998). 
52 See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. 
L. REV. 2041, 2046 (2000). 
53 Id. at 2046-52. 
54 See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 586 (2008) (arguing that soft law may prompt people to adjust their 
behavior, therefore obviating need for hard law). Commenting in the European Union context, 
where the use of soft law is more prevalent, one observer defined soft law as “rules of conduct 
that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force as such, 
but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed at and may 
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norm itself does not overcome the collective action problem and catalyze 
compliance with a norm, a certification regime (like Energy Star) for those who 
are compliant (along with naming and shaming) might do so. 
One path for catalyzing compliance, which can be labeled as “jawboning” or 
“threats,” involves the use of apparent legal authority—say, opening up an 
investigation—to achieve a desired result. In a provocative article, Professor 
Tim Wu defends the use of “threats,” calling for norm entrepreneurship by 
agency leaders and the development of limiting principles for the practice.55 In 
criticizing Wu’s argument, some commentators have characterized it as 
condoning lawless conduct.56 In that spirit, I previously criticized the FCC’s use 
of its merger review authority to secure outcomes in other contexts that were not 
specifically related to the merger.57 I also called the FCC’s use of “arm twisting” 
controversial when done without full transparency and a willingness to take 
formal action.58 Finally, I noted that the tactic is “dangerous” if the agency is not 
willing and able to follow through with formal regulation if the called-for 
behavior does not take place, as the meaningless nature of the threat will become 
plain and the agency will lose credibility.59 
Any agency that develops best practices should be aware of the potential risks 
of such an effort. For starters, if an agency’s identified best practices are allowed 
to become stale, some private actors might stick with them and fail to improve 
their practice. Second, given that there is no judicial oversight of best practices 
development,60 it is important that agencies pre-commit to a level of procedural 
regularity and fairness in how they develop them. Third, without either carrots 
or sticks related to best practices, an agency may find it difficult to generate 
attention or catalyze compliance.61 
 
produce practical effects.” Linda A.J. Senden, Soft Law and Its Implications for Institutional 
Balance in the EC, 1 UTRECHT L. REV. 79, 81 (2005). 
55 See Tim Wu, Essay, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1842-43 (2011) (arguing that 
the use of threats is useful and justified where regulated industry undergoes rapid change). 
56 See Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51, 65 (2015) 
(criticizing “informal enforcement” where formal actions are proscribed by First Amendment 
or other legal constraints); Jerry Brito, “Agency Threats” and the Rule of Law: An Offer You 
Can’t Refuse, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 553, 553 (2014) (criticizing “policymaking through 
the issuance of completely unenforceable threats”). 
57 See Weiser, supra note 7, at 708-11. 
58 Weiser, supra note 35, at 559. 
59 See id. at 559-60. 
60 See Zaring, supra note 47, at 310 (noting lack of judicial review or requirement to use 
open notice-and-comment process); infra Section III.C. 
61 Where the best practices developed by an agency might arguably provide a safe harbor 
from potential tort liability, that can be a powerful incentive. Similarly, where a governmental 
authority supports a best practice—either by requirement (say, a zoning code) or subsidy—it 
can encourage compliance. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 47, at 326-38 (discussing Clean 
Water Act’s Section 319 approach to reducing nonpoint source pollution). 
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D. Private Regulation 
As exemplified by the LEED building standard, a private regulatory initiative 
can drive behavior toward a social goal. Given the need to respond to emerging 
issues more adaptably than traditional regulatory processes allow, public 
agencies may be tempted to rely on private bodies.62 In the internet environment, 
for example, a range of issues are managed by multi-stakeholder organizations, 
which use “dialogue to develop voluntary norms and best practices.”63 Similarly, 
in the environmental field, a range of “private activity generates pressure on 
environmental behavior without resulting in a statute, regulation, agency 
enforcement action, or court decision for review by scholars and 
policymakers.”64 
The role of private, multi-stakeholder efforts in internet governance is the 
U.S. government’s official policy.65 Since the development of the internet’s 
basic technical standards in the 1980s and 1990s by groups like the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) and the World Wide Web Consortium 
(“W3C”), “these entities have largely established the norms and standards for 
the global internet, but they are little known to the general public.”66 The U.S. 
government recently fully embraced this model, recognizing the need for 
internet policy and governance issues to be developed in an adaptable and global 
fashion.67 This embrace includes supporting the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) as an independent, international 
body to oversee the internet’s numbering system.68 
In the internet context, two private regulatory efforts bear notice, as both exist 
in tandem with legal and regulatory oversight. First, the Copyright Alert System 
(overseen by the Center for Copyright Information) was a cooperative effort 
between broadband providers and content providers focused on addressing 
 
62 See Pitofsky, supra note 38 (explaining reasons why governmental agencies might 
encourage private regulation). 
63 Joe Waz & Phil Weiser, Internet Governance: The Role of Multistakeholder 
Organizations, 10 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 331, 336 (2012). 
64 Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 
138 (2013). 
65 See Waz & Weiser, supra note 63, at 344 n.29. 
66 Id. at 332. 
67 See Lawrence E. Strickling, Moving Together Beyond Dubai, NAT’L TELECOMM. & 
INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2013/moving-together-beyond-
dubai [https://perma.cc/93UD-MQGC]. 
68 Olivier Sylvain, Legitimacy and Expertise in Global Internet Governance, 13 COLO. 
TECH. L.J. 31, 31-41 (2015). 
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piracy in peer-to-peer networks.69 This initiative, which existed for four years,70 
provided some measure of guidance to the broadband industry on what sort of 
“repeat infringer” policy was reasonable.71 In light of recent court decisions 
holding a broadband provider liable for failing to develop an appropriate repeat 
infringer policy, the guidance from this organization could be considered best 
practice and protect a provider from liability,72 although its cessation of 
operations may limit its impact. Second, the Broadband Internet Technical 
Advisory Group (“BITAG”) is a multi-stakeholder organization that seeks to 
define best practices and broadband network management ahead of any FCC 
action under its network neutrality regime.73 In its most recent regulatory 
decision on network neutrality, the FCC highlighted its openness to “obtain[ing] 
objective advice from industry standard-setting bodies or similar organizations,” 
specifically citing BITAG as an example.74 
Both the Center for Copyright Information and BITAG relied on a mix of 
industry representatives and public interest advocates and operated in an open, 
transparent, and consensus-based manner.75 Like frequency coordinators and the 
 
69 See What Is a Copyright Alert?, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO., 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-system/what-is-a-copyright-alert 
[https://perma.cc/BXE9-ATP5] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (explaining how Copyright Alert 
worked). 
70 See Statement on the Copyright Alert System, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO. (Jan. 27, 2017), 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/statement/statement-on-the-copyright-alert-system/ 
[https://perma.cc/H8MV-6XRT] (discussing how the Copyright Alert System closed down in 
early 2017). 
71 In the Memorandum of Understanding for the Copyright Alert System the parties stated 
that the practices adopted did not speak to the standard of liability imposed by the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), but the framework still provided a plausible basis for 
establishing the reasonableness of the participating ISP’s attitude toward repeat infringers. 
Memorandum of Understanding 8-9 (2011), https://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Memorandum-of-Understanding.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4SM-6WZ 
K]; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2012) (conditioning DMCA immunity on proof that 
defendant “adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account 
holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the 
termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service 
provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers”). 
72 BMG Rights Mgmt. (US), LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 634, 661 (E.D. 
Va. 2015) (faulting Cox for failing to implement adequate repeat-infringer policy). 
73 See BITAG History, BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., 
https://www.bitag.org/bitag_organization.php?action=history# [https://perma.cc/A5S8-QZV 
4] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
74 In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5612, 5720 n.697 
(2015). 
75 BITAG’s membership is outlined at BITAG Membership, BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. 
ADVISORY GRP., http://members.bitag.org/kwspub/BITAG_Membership [https://perma.cc/ 
6WUV-UANV] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). The membership of the Center for Copyright 
Information is outlined at About CCI, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO., http://www.copyright 
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NAD, the bodies confronted the challenge of earning their legitimacy and claim 
to regulatory authority. If such efforts succeeded, the FCC and copyright courts 
would regard their guidance as meaningful, just as the FTC and courts do with 
respect to the actions of the NAD.76 
In the environmental realm, the Marine Stewardship Council (“MSC”) is an 
instructive case study on how a multi-stakeholder private regulatory initiative 
can have a major impact. The MSC, founded by the World Wildlife Fund and 
Unilever, was launched to address the concern about fisheries operating in a 
sustainable fashion.77 As one commentator explained, “[t]he MSC administers 
standards for sustainable fisheries, updates the standards periodically with input 
from a stakeholder advisory group, evaluates fisheries, and allows those 
fisheries that meet certain criteria to label their fish as MSC-certified.”78 The 
MSC standard focuses on three core concerns: (1) maintaining sustainable fish 
stocks; (2) minimizing any adverse environmental impact; and (3) managing the 
fishery effectively, including compliance with relevant legal requirements.79 
Under the MSC-administered regime, independent private auditors must assess 
compliance with the relevant standards and compliant products can be labeled 
as such.80 Indeed, the MSC regime allows any organization with concerns 
related to certification to make a formal objection during the certification 
process.81 
 
information.org/about-cci [https://perma.cc/U6NH-2NFU] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). See 
Waz & Weiser, supra note 63, at 342-43 (discussing best practices for such organizations 
generally). 
76 Villafranco & Riley, supra note 40, at 80. 
77 MSC Fisheries Standard, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.msc.org/about-
us/standards/fisheries-standard [https://perma.cc/D3D4-Y6E9] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); 
Sustainable Seafood: The First 20 Years, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://20-
years.msc.org/ [https://perma.cc/E96R-Z8EZ] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). It was based on a 
similar model, the Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”) program, also founded by the World 
Wildlife Fund. See Our History, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/en-
us/who-we-are/our-history [https://perma.cc/28X4-Q23N] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); 
What’s Behind the FSC Logo?, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.worldwild 
life.org/stories/what-s-behind-the-fsc-logo [https://perma.cc/6ZC9-WJL3] (last visited Nov. 
17, 2017) (discussing connection between World Wildlife Fund and FSC). 
78 Vandenbergh, supra note 64, at 149 (citing About Us, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, 
http://www.msc.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/7DW4-5MT5] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017)). 
79 MSC Fisheries Standard, supra note 77. 
80 See Get Certified, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.msc.org/get-
certified/fisheries/msc-fisheries-standard-explained [https://perma.cc/W2SM-LCWF] (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
81 Patricia A. Moye, Private Certification Versus Public Certification in the International 
Environmental Arena: The Marine Stewardship Council and Marine Eco-Label Japan 
Fisheries Certification Schemes as Case Studies, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 533, 544 (2010). 
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The MSC provides a powerful example of how private regulation can work 
even when not reinforced by public regulation.82 By 2012, sixty percent of the 
fish caught in U.S. fisheries for human consumption were MSC-certified and 
major corporations, such as Wal-Mart and McDonald’s, had committed to 
selling only MSC-certified, wild-caught fish.83 Moreover, the MSC’s private 
regime drove compliance with the nonbinding Code of Conduct, developed by 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, by making it part of its 
requirements.84 After surveying this regime and formal regulatory efforts to 
address the issue, one commentator concluded that the MSC model was more 
successful than traditional regulatory efforts in this area and that “private 
regulation is best situated to address the complex problem of fisheries 
depletion.”85 
In short, private regulatory efforts, such as those led by multi-stakeholder 
organizations, can influence private behavior whether they operate in tandem 
with public regulatory oversight or in a vacuum created by a lack of regulatory 
oversight. Whether they operate in the backdrop of public oversight or as a 
standalone effort, private bodies need to establish their legitimacy to influence 
behavior on the ground. To do so, they must have sufficient independence from 
those they oversee, enabling both regulators and consumers to trust their 
judgments (including determinations of compliance).86 
 
82 To be sure, the FTC serves as an important public backstop, overseeing unfair and 
deceptive marketing practices. In particular, the FTC has developed “Green Guides,” which 
govern the MSC’s actions. Jason J. Czarnezki, Andrew Homan & Meghan Jeans, 
Greenwashing and Self-Declared Seafood Ecolabels, 28 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 48 (2014). In 
the past, the FTC has taken action against third party certification efforts, sanctioning 
TRUSTe for its failure to conduct annual recertification. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
TRUSTe Settles FTC Charges It Deceived Consumers Through Its Privacy Seal Program: Company 
Failed to Conduct Annual Recertifications, Facilitated Misrepresentation as Non-Profit (Nov. 17, 
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/truste-settles-ftc-charges-it-
deceived-consumers-through-its [https://perma.cc/RCM5-2JSU]. 
83 Vandenbergh, supra note 64, at 150. Part of what drives such behavior is that outside 
groups monitor compliance (or lack thereof). Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of 
Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47, 75 (2006). 
84 Vandenbergh, supra note 64, at 150. 
85 Moye, supra note 81, at 564. Other commentators offer more qualified praise. See, e.g., 
Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Accountability Arrangements in Non-State Standards Organizations: 
Instrumental Design and Imitation, 15 ORG. 563, 570 (2008) (praising MSC model as 
complement to and catalyst for public regulatory oversight in this area); Zdravka Tzankova, 
Interactions Between Private and Public Resource Governance: Key Insights from the 
Fisheries Case, 6 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1, 4 n.13, 6, 25 (2014) (same); see also ARCHON 
FUNG ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSPARENCY: WHAT MAKES DISCLOSURE 
POLICIES EFFECTIVE? 29 (2004), http://ash.harvard.edu/files/political_econ_transparency.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8H6X-WRBU]. 
86 Deborah Platt Majoras, FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS AND 
THE FTC 4-5 (2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/ 
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E. Hacking the Bureaucracy 
In most situations, Congress and agencies think along traditional lines and 
agency leaders continue on the established path of agency regulation, under-
utilizing the alternative models discussed above.87 There are a number of reasons 
for this dynamic, including the power of “path dependency and bureaucratic 
entrenchment.”88 Even more powerfully, the incentives for policymakers are 
often to avoid Type 1 errors—those visible errors of commission—that arise 
when trying a new strategy that might fail. By contrast, the hidden Type 2 
errors—ones of omission—are permissible and a regular feature of bureaucratic 
inertia.89 
On one account, the challenge of leading a bureaucracy is captured by the 
reality that governmental employees, who enjoy civil service protection, can tell 
their politically-selected leaders, “I was here long before you arrived and will be 
here long after you are gone.” In practice, such explicit defiance is the exception. 
Regardless of whether bureaucratic inertia is willful or based on an entrenched 
tradition governmental agencies are built to continue the same course. 
Consequently, any course corrections require energetic leadership.90 And 
governmental employees are generally conditioned “to be quiet, take orders, and 
do their jobs in a repetitive way.”91 On the positive side, governmental 
employees tend to have a service orientation and are mission driven, meaning 
 
self-regulatory-organizations-and-ftc/050411selfregorgs.pdf [https://perma.cc/53ZF-Q4Y3] 
(underscoring this issue and invoking Better Business Bureau as case in point). 
87 Reeve T. Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and 
Rulemaking Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 265, 306-07 (2015) (“[O]ne can reasonably expect 
underutilization of such alternatives to agency-driven regulation merely because they are 
novel and command-and-control programs are well entrenched.”). 
88 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1144 (2012). 
89 See DANIEL C. ESTY, REGULATORY EXCELLENCE: LESSONS FROM THEORY AND PRACTICE 
5 (2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4714-esty-ppr-bicregulatordiscussionpaper-
062015pdf [https://perma.cc/XNU6-D7MQ] (“Inertia is a powerful force in every 
organization, but especially in government where there is often little incentive to innovate.”). 
This dynamic is further reinforced by cognitive biases, notably, the “endowment effect.” 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government 
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 605 (2012). 
90 On a critical account, “[o]pportunism, conflict of interest, and asymmetric 
information—the bases of willful noncompliance—are rampant at the lower level.” Terry M. 
Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
1, 17 (1994). On a more generous take, “the career incentives and training of civil servants 
usually orient them towards perpetuating the stability of their institutions, rather than 
embracing administrative innovations.” Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 421, 473 (2015). 
91 JOHN P. KOTTER, ACCELERATE: BUILDING STRATEGIC AGILITY FOR A FASTER-MOVING 
WORLD 15 (2014). 
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that effective engagement around the mission and purpose of the agenda can 
catalyze innovation and collaboration.92 
Bureaucratic inertia and autopilot administration not only prevent innovative 
programs from being developed, but also can lead existing programs to be 
administered badly. Take, for example, the development of the healthcare.gov 
website. After Congress passed the Affordable Care Act, a health care 
economist, David Cutler, encouraged the White House to treat the 
administration of the law more like “launching a start-up than passing a law.”93 
In particular, Cutler made clear that the default strategy—using the existing 
personnel at the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”)—for 
administering the law was a recipe for failure.94 In an assessment ignored by the 
White House, he explained that CMS “is demoralized, the best people have left, 
IT services are antiquated, and there are fewer employees than in 1981, despite 
a much larger burden.”95 
Cutler’s call for an entrepreneurial approach to implementing the Affordable 
Care Act was rejected by President Obama.96 Perhaps fearing the need to 
manage political warfare with House Republicans or responding to the HHS’ 
interest in protecting its turf, President Obama agreed to, in Cutler’s words, pile 
“new responsibilities onto a broken system.”97 As this episode underscores, even 
when the current system is flawed, the pressure to use it is powerful. As a result, 
the healthcare.gov website cost $800 million to develop, whereas Twitter, which 
serves a similar number of users and is of comparable complexity, cost only $60 
million.98 
The redeeming part of the healthcare.gov story is that it demonstrates that 
treating a government project like a startup can work. After the failed rollout of 
healthcare.gov (which only enabled six people to sign up for insurance on its 
first day), President Obama essentially embraced Cutler’s recommendation, 
 
92 Robert Lavigna, Why Government Workers Are Harder to Motivate, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Nov. 28, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/11/why-government-workers-are-harder-to-motivate 
[https://perma.cc/RR92-YSUD] (“Research has shown that public servants find meaning in 
their work by making a positive difference in the lives of the citizens they serve. This is an 
advantage in building engagement.”). 
93 Ezra Klein, The Memo that Could Have Saved Obamacare, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/11/04/the-memo-that-could-have-
saved-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/XPL4-QRF3]. 
94 See id. 
95 Memorandum from David Cutler to Larry Summers (May 11, 2010), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/files/2013/11/Cutler-implementation-memo-1.pdf?tid=a_in 
l [https://perma.cc/VJ82-HTQP]. 
96 See Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin, HealthCare.gov: How a Start-Up Failed to 
Launch, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2013, at A01. 
97 Memorandum from David Cutler to Larry Summers, supra note 95, at 3; Goldstein & 
Eilperin, supra note 96, at A01. (“[T]he project was hampered by the White House’s political 
sensitivity to Republican hatred of the law . . . .”). 
98 Jon Gertner, Obama and His Geeks, FAST COMPANY, July-Aug. 2015, at 56, 64-65. 
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authorizing Todd Park, Mikey Dickerson, and a team of entrepreneurs to operate 
in a new structure that was called “tech surge.”99 This project, like a good startup, 
approached the challenge of building an effective website from first principles. 
Rather than ask how the government had done IT projects before, the team 
innovated (for government) in a number of important ways, including using 
Amazon Web Services to support the site.100 In developing the new website, it 
broke from the traditional bureaucratic process of “waterfall” development 
(where every step is prescribed and locked-in) and used “agile” development 
(where the process is iterative and evolves along the way).101 Finally, the team 
built a login system for $4 million (with annual maintenance costs of $1 million) 
to replace the initial version that did not work well and cost $250 million to build 
(with $70 million annual maintenance costs).102 
In an important legacy of this effort, Park and Dickerson continued to work 
in government after fixing healthcare.gov, developing the new U.S. Digital 
Service (“USDS”).103 The goal of the USDS is to lure a range of talented 
technology professionals to the federal government, including data scientists, 
product managers, and product designers.104 The USDS, in turn, provides 
guidance to government agencies on questions like how they can use Amazon 
Web Services.105 In short, the USDS supports entrepreneurial leadership in 
government; and as Park said, it develops “people who can hack the technology, 
as well as people who can hack the bureaucracy.”106 
The healthcare.gov story now has two parts. The first is the cautionary tale 
about government’s traditional inertial default setting—that is, to do things as 
they were done before. The second underscores that entrepreneurial leadership 
 
99 See Steven Levy, America’s Tech Guru Steps down—but He’s Not Done Rebooting the 
Government, WIRED (Aug. 28, 2014, 2:15 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/08/healthcare-
gov/ [https://perma.cc/43JY-3XKB]. 
100 See Robinson Meyer, The Secret Startup that Saved the Worst Website in America, 
ATLANTIC (July 9, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/07/the-secret-
startup-saved-healthcare-gov-the-worst-website-in-america/397784/ [https://perma.cc/P9LL-
J689]. 
101 See id. 
102 Id. 
103 Gertner, supra note 98, at 62. 
104 See id. 
105 For one example of its impact, and another encouraging post-healthcare.gov tale of 
entrepreneurial leadership, consider the Veterans’ Administration’s recent progress in 
improving its service delivery. See Nick Sinai, The Untold Story of VA Leadership, MEDIUM 
(Dec. 8, 2016), https://medium.com/@NickSinai/the-untold-story-of-va-leadership-f6d763ec 
6c51#.otd5qig33 [https://perma.cc/F2C9-3VVJ]. 
106 Gertner, supra note 98, at 64. 
  
2017] ENTREPRENEURIAL ADMINISTRATION 2031 
 
in government is both possible and important, and can lead to transformative 
results.107 
The positive legacy of the healthcare.gov story is that entrepreneurial leaders 
in government can free their agencies from “the mental grip of conventional 
structures on the capacity to consider alternatives.”108 In so doing, such leaders 
can facilitate the development of alternative regulatory strategies. Similarly, 
governmental agencies face the challenge of overcoming the institutional bias 
that “experts may myopically focus on issues within their area of expertise and 
thereby fail to recognize that a decision would benefit from accessing other 
bodies of knowledge or ways of thinking.”109 In short, an important role of 
entrepreneurial leadership in government is to examine issues through the lens 
of first principles.110 
The concept of policy entrepreneurship recognizes that an entrepreneurial 
mindset and skillset can be applied to governance to foster innovative results. 
Professor Adam Sheingate, for example, defines the concept as the “skillful 
manipulation of politics [that] somehow results in the creation of a new policy 
or a new bureaucratic agency, creates a new institution, or transforms an existing 
one.”111 This type of leadership can also be seen in the development of, for 
example, the MSC program, the FTC’s oversight of online privacy, and the 
Energy Star program. In a world where the best solutions may well require new 
models of regulation, it is critical that agency leaders experiment with new 
solutions.112 
 
107 A complementary initiative to USDS is the White House Office of Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, which encourages a range of experiments to improve government 
performance and policy outcomes. See Justin Wolfers, Making Government Work More Like 
Google, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2015, § BU (Economic View), at 6. As one commentator put 
it, the office seeks to “[e]xperiment relentlessly, keep what works, and discard what doesn’t” 
and has already developed a number of successes. Id. 
108 Sabel & Simon, supra note 18, at 1075. 
109 Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 89, at 560; see id. at 599-600 (suggesting strategies for 
improving governmental decisionmaking). 
110 The goal of this mindset is to frame a problem in general terms and evaluate whether 
there are innovative strategies for solving it by getting people to look past the obvious and 
traditional approaches. See Tony McCaffrey & Jim Pearson, Find Innovation Where You 
Least Expect It, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2015, at 82, 88-89. 
111 Adam Sheingate, Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American 
Political Development, 17 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 185, 188 (2003); see also MARK SCHNEIDER, 
PAUL TESKE & MICHAEL MINTROM, PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURS: AGENTS FOR CHANGE IN 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 8 (1995) (defining public entrepreneurs as those who identify 
opportunities, take risks, and work with others to pursue goals); Peter G. Klein et al., Toward 
a Theory of Public Entrepreneurship, 7 EUR. MGMT. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (“[P]ublic entrepreneurs 
are alert to opportunities for gain, exercise judgment over the use of private and public 
resources, and may pursue innovative products and processes.”). 
112 To that end, in her Nobel Prize talk, Elinor Ostrom highlighted the importance of 
institutional innovation. See Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric 
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A significant hurdle for entrepreneurial leadership in government—and a 
foundation of the inertial default setting—is the lack of acceptance of failure as 
an outcome. In practice, this means that governmental agencies often reflexively 
turn to traditional regulatory models and do not consider untested alternatives 
(often out of fear of failure).113 This instinct mirrors the old private sector saw 
that “nobody got fired for buying IBM.”114 Citing the fear of failure and risk 
aversion, former Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick explained, “there may 
be no industry less susceptible to innovation than government.”115 There are, 
however, exceptions, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (“DARPA”), which makes a conscious effort to promote a “risk-taking 
and failure-tolerant culture.”116 
In the entrepreneurship environment, failure is a normal state, providing data, 
an opportunity to iterate, and a spur to refine a product offering.117 
Consequently, entrepreneurs celebrate the need to “fail fast” on new experiments 
by trying them on a small scale and determining as quickly as possible whether 
they can work.118 As two advocates of innovation in government put it, “[a] 
 
Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 641, 665 (2010) (“We need 
to ask how diverse polycentric institutions help or hinder the innovativeness, learning, 
adapting, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and the achievement of more 
effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales.”). 
113 Glen Hepburn, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ALTERNATIVES TO 
TRADITIONAL REGULATION 10 (2006), http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/42245468. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/8GQT-HJ6C] (“The ‘regulate first’ approach may mean that more 
effective and efficient policy instruments are being overlooked.”). 
114 See id. at 11-12 (noting that non-traditional strategies are generally eschewed by risk-
averse regulators). 
115 Deval Patrick on Government Innovation and the Massachusetts “Edge,” MASS. INST. 
TECH. (May 12, 2015), http://mitsloan.mit.edu/newsroom/articles/deval-patrick-on-govern 
ment-innovation-and-the-massachusetts-edge [https://perma.cc/PLZ3-PDTJ]. 
116 Stephen Overly, This Agency Loses a Quarter of Its Workers Each Year—and That’s a 
Good Thing, WASH. POST (July 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
innovations/wp/2016/07/14/why-high-employee-turnover-keeps-one-agency-innovative/ 
[https://perma.cc/MC9W-H56Q]; see DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS AGENCY, INNOVATION 
AT DARPA 2 (2016), http://www.darpa.mil/attachments/DARPA_Innovation_2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8XRK-KNYA]. 
117 As one writer described entrepreneurs, “[t]hey’ve been conditioned to see failure as a 
learning experience—that, rather than being the end of something, a big flop is merely a very 
useful (though painful) data point along the way to success.” Jason Feifer, This Exclusive 
Study Reveals Entrepreneurs Really Do Have Thicker Skins, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 14, 2016), 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/284075 [https://perma.cc/VM3F-23RN]. 
118 As one commentator explained: “Fail fast isn’t about the big issues, it’s about the little 
ones. It’s an approach to running a company or developing a product that embraces lots of 
little experiments with the idea that some will work and grow and others will fail and die.” 
David Brown, Here’s What ‘Fail Fast’ Really Means, VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 15, 2015, 7:00 
AM), http://venturebeat.com/2015/03/15/heres-what-fail-fast-really-means [https://perma.cc/ 
2S3G-4HV8]. 
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culture of innovation means continuously exploring and adopting new processes 
in an ecosystem where risk is incentivized, not precluded.”119 Similarly, 
entrepreneurial leadership in government authorizes calculated risk-taking and, 
more importantly, provides cover for trial-and-error learning when the trials do 
not produce the envisioned results.120 Unfortunately, leaders who support 
experimentation and are willing to accept the inevitable failures, are the 
exception, not the rule.121 
The basic entrepreneurial methodology of experiment-measure-iterate is 
captured in Eric Ries’s classic book, The Lean Startup.122 A core thesis of the 
book, widely accepted in the entrepreneurial community (and ignored by most 
legal scholars),123 is that companies should develop and market a “minimum 
viable product,” solicit feedback from actual customers, and improve it based on 
that data.124 At Facebook, this philosophy was adopted and embodied in its 
mantra, “[d]one is better than perfect.” Citing that mantra, one commentator 
explained that “had Facebook waited so much as a year to perfect its model, the 
company might very well be where MySpace is today.”125 
The Ries philosophy is famously captured in a feedback loop representing the 
cycle of innovation.126 The core idea is to embrace experimentation, gather data 
 
119 GEORGETOWN UNIV., THE ARCHITECTURE OF INNOVATION: INSTITUTIONALIZING 
INNOVATION IN FEDERAL POLICYMAKING 7 (2016), https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/z0vlob 
eoycdlo54g4wxby87kk71c3aua [https://perma.cc/GC32-BRQZ]. 
120 See Quentin Hardy, G.A.O. Tech Chief Says Washington Should Start Small on Big 
Projects, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/g-
a-o-tech-director-says-washington-needs-to-think-smaller/ (noting failure to develop pilot 
projects and to candidly assess failing efforts). 
121 Philadelphia Mayor Mike Nutter is one of those exceptions, stating: “If you don’t fail, 
you’re not trying hard enough.” Li Zhou, City Governments Are Collaborating with Startups, 
and Acting Like Ones Themselves, SMITHSONIAN (June 10, 2015), http://www.smithsonian 
mag.com/innovation/citie-governments-are-collaborating-startups-and-acting-ones-themselv 
es-180955483/ [https://perma.cc/2ZWN-NLAZ]. 
122 See generally ERIC RIES, THE LEAN STARTUP: HOW TODAY’S ENTREPRENEURS USE 
CONTINUOUS INNOVATION TO CREATE RADICALLY SUCCESSFUL BUSINESSES (2011). 
123 One exception is Richard S. Gruner, Lean Law Compliance: Confronting and 
Overcoming Legal Uncertainty in Business Enterprises and Other Complex Organizations, 
11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 247, 292-93 (2014). 
124 RIES, supra note 122, at 3-5. This methodology is very close to the approach espoused 
by “design-centered thinking,” which also emphasizes the importance of prototyping. On this 
approach, the goal of developing, testing, and even marketing a prototype is “to learn about 
the strengths and weaknesses of the idea and to identify new directions that further 
prototyping might take.” Tim Brown, Design Thinking, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2008, at 84, 
87. 
125 Martin Lindstrom, The Truth About Being “Done” Versus Being “Perfect,” FAST 
COMPANY (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.fastcompany.com/3001533/truth-about-being-done-
versus-being-perfect [https://perma.cc/JJ6M-MNX2]. 
126 RIES, supra note 122, at 9-11. 
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(whether it signals success or failure), and iterate.127 The lean startup model, 
represented by the following diagram, focuses on taking ideas from prototype to 




This lean startup model echoes the style of software development championed 
by open source software, which calls for releasing code that can be viewed and 
improved by a community of users and developers. In what Eric Raymond 
dubbed “Linus’s Law,” in honor of the founder and coordinator of Linux, the 
open source maxim is “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.”129 This 
approach has spread far beyond open source, enabling “business webs where 
focused companies partner others to innovate and create value.”130 Although this 
 
127 See id. 
128 The Lean Startup Methodology, THE LEAN STARTUP, http://theleanstartup.com/ 
principles [https://perma.cc/7WVV-VNQ8] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
129 Scott Merrill, With Many Eyeballs, All Bugs Are Shallow, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 23, 
2012), https://techcrunch.com/2012/02/23/with-many-eyeballs-all-bugs-are-shallow/ [https:// 
perma.cc/W2AT-H78N]. 
130 Don Tapscott, The World in 2036, ECONOMIST (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.econ 
omist.com/node/17509361 [https://perma.cc/HS2S-F59Z]. In referencing this concept, and 
Linus’s Law, I do not mean to suggest that the open source model is perfect or even 
necessarily always better than proprietary software, which has some advantages as managed 
by a single firm. Consider, for example, the shortcomings of the open source program 
Heartbleed, which led to a major security vulnerability in OpenSSL. See Robert McMillan, 
How Heartbleed Broke the Internet—and Why It Can Happen Again, WIRED (Apr. 14, 2014), 
https://www.wired.com/2014/04/heartbleedslesson [http://perma.cc/EF6Z-E6L7]. In that 
case, the mostly-volunteer labor force was too short-handed to keep the software bug-free, 
demonstrating that “we must add more oversight to the internet’s underlying infrastructure.” 
Id. 
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approach and a commitment to prototyping and testing solutions is novel in 
government, it is starting to take root, with promising results.131 
With respect to the fear of failure, government operates quite differently than 
the entrepreneurial world. In government, the perceived costs of failure are 
sufficiently high that many governmental leaders decline to introduce a new 
initiative for fear it will fail or refuse to admit that an existing program is failing, 
even though that admission is a necessary predicate for improvement. To be 
sure, there are cases like the initial healthcare.gov rollout where the failure is 
readily apparent and must be fixed. In other cases, however, governmental 
leaders stand by programs where the data backing up its effectiveness is either 
uncertain or doubtful. 
For an instructive case of governmental leaders refusing to acknowledge the 
limitations of a program, consider the case of the EPA’s Performance Track 
program. When created, the program was supposed to highlight those companies 
with stellar environmental records.132 In practice, however, it ultimately became, 
as EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson put it, “just one of those window-dressing 
programs that has little value.”133 Similarly, the EPA Inspector General 
criticized the program as ineffective, noting that it did not provide “a new model 
for achieving” its stated goals and very few companies met their stated goals.134 
Nonetheless, the Bush Administration did not make any real changes to the 
program before the Obama Administration cancelled it.135 
The Performance Track program story, like the failure to acknowledge the 
failings of the healthcare.gov website earlier, underscores that the hesitancy to 
acknowledge failure is a major challenge in governmental administration. If 
governmental leaders refuse to acknowledge failures, they undermine the ability 
to learn—and iterate—from mistakes and instead allow failed programs to 
 
131 For a criticism of government’s lack of investment in experiments, see Peter Orzag & 
John Bridgeland, Can Government Play Moneyball?, ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2013, at 62 
(concluding that “federal government—where spending decisions are largely based on good 
intentions, inertia, hunches, partisan politics, and personal relationships—has missed this 
wave”). For a discussion of the use of this approach, see Russell Shorto, Water Works, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2014, at MM20 (discussing use of public design challenge). 
132 John Sullivan and John Shiffman, Green Club an EPA Charade, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 
12, 2008, A01. 
133 Id. 
134 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Report No. 2007-P-00013, PERFORMANCE TRACK COULD 
IMPROVE PROGRAM DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT TO ENSURE VALUE 4, 15, 18 (2007), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/20070329-2007-p-00013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P8HX-Q33L]; see generally Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, 
Performance Track’s Postmortem: Lessons from the Rise and Fall of EPA’s “Flagship” 
Voluntary Program, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2014) (criticizing Performance Track 
program). 
135 Coglianese & Nash, supra note 134, at 8. 
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continue during a period of denial.136 Or, as Lawrence Summers put it while 
reflecting on the healthcare.gov debacle, it is crucial to resist the “overwhelming 
temptation for everyone involved [in a project] to circle the wagons and promise 
rapid repair so as to hold critics at bay.”137 
Another challenging dynamic for governmental leaders to address is the 
impact of unconscious bias. It is normal for those involved in a project to believe 
that it is working, following what Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman calls 
“confirmation bias.”138 As one commentator put it, a challenge for those 
evaluating regulatory experiments is that those “deeply involved in the 
implementation of a particular regulation are likely to see the benefits of such a 
project far more clearly than the costs.”139 As commentators have explained, 
there are a number of strategies for overcoming this bias, including using red 
team-blue team exercises, appointing a Devil’s Advocate, and creating a process 
for deliberate decisionmaking.140 Of course, as happened in the Performance 
Track situation, new leadership is able to bring a fresh perspective. Ideally, 
however, existing leaders can step back and ask, “if a new leader came in and 
took a fresh look, what would she do?”141 
 
136 Id. at 86 (“To achieve the true learning potential from these programs, government 
officials must be prepared to accept that innovations can sometimes fail.”). 
137 Lawrence Summers, Lawrence Summers: Immediate Lessons from Health-Care 
Reform, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lawrence-
summers-immediate-lessons-from-health-care-reform/2013/11/10/5b5be00e-48c8-11e3-a19 
6-3544a03c2351_story.html?utm_term=.245c9ac1e9e0 [https://perma.cc/WR7W-ZS2E]. 
138 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST & SLOW 80-81 (2011). 
139 Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation and 
Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 111, 119 (David Moss & John Cisternino 
eds., 2009). 
140 In their book, Decisive, the Heath brothers examine such strategies for improving 
evaluation and decisionmaking. See CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, DECISIVE: HOW TO MAKE 
BETTER CHOICES IN LIFE AND WORK 22-23 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: 
Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1015-16 
(2005) (advocating use of “devil’s advocates” to improve decision making). 
141 Andy Grove, in his classic, Only the Paranoid Survive, tells a story just along these 
lines on how Intel decided to get out of the memory chip business and focus on 
microprocessors: 
I was in my office with Intel’s chairman and CEO, Gordon Moore, and we were 
discussing our quandary. Our mood was downbeat. I looked out the window at the Ferris 
Wheel of the Great America amusement park revolving in the distance, then I turned 
back to Gordon and asked, “If we got kicked out and the board brought in a new CEO, 
what do you think he would do?” Gordon answered without hesitation, “He would get 
us out of memories.” I stared at him, numb, then said, “Why don’t you and I walk out the 
door, come back and do it ourselves?” 
ANDREW S. GROVE, ONLY THE PARANOID SURVIVE: HOW TO EXPLOIT THE CRISIS POINTS THAT 
CHALLENGE EVERY COMPANY AND CAREER 89 (1996). For another telling of this story and its 
impact, see HEATH & HEATH, supra note 140, at 13-16. 
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The role of entrepreneurial leadership in encouraging candid reflection and 
criticism is essential. As former FTC Chair Bill Kovacic and David Hyman 
explain, agencies develop an institutional culture and a reputation (or a brand, 
as they put it).142 In some cases, that brand can be one of reliability and 
commitment to data-driven decisionmaking. An important role of an 
entrepreneurial leader is to develop and maintain that commitment. In the case 
of Underwriters Laboratory (“UL”), for example, its early leadership did just 
that, building up “UL’s reputation for reliability by creating organizational 
structures, administrative routines, and oversight systems designed to prevent 
mistakes and misconduct.”143 To get past the natural status quo bias, an 
entrepreneurial leader should welcome diverse ideas, criticism, different 
options, and experimentation.144 In Part II, to explain how policy 
entrepreneurship can earn regulatory authority, I discuss how experimental 
initiatives need to establish their effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability to 
be embraced as lasting regulatory regimes. 
II. CRITERIA FOR SOUND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND REGULATORY 
EXPERIMENTATION 
Whether by design or default, Congress often sits back, allowing regulatory 
authorities and private entities to experiment with innovative regulatory 
strategies. Under the traditional model of regulation, this phenomenon is viewed 
as a bug—or an aberration. In practice, however, this alternative model is 
emerging as a feature of our regulatory system and is a strategy that Congress 
should use more self-consciously going forward. 
This Part discusses the three principal criteria for regulatory innovation. First, 
regulatory experiments should establish their effectiveness through after-the-
fact assessment. Second, regulatory experiments should be legitimate, both in 
terms of their legal status and how they operate in practice. Third, regulatory 
experiments should be accountable—that is, they need to operate transparently 
and as promised. After explaining these criteria, this Part evaluates the potential 
objections to policy experimentation through entrepreneurial leadership. 
A. Effectiveness 
The value of a regulatory experiment will depend on whether it advances its 
envisioned purposes effectively. Historically, however, governments “have paid 
remarkably little attention to analyzing regulations after adoption or to 
evaluating the impacts of the procedures and practices that govern the regulatory 
 
142 David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental 
Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1472-74. 
143 Timothy D. Lytton, Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification 
Can Overcome Constraints that Frustrate Government Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 539, 545 (2014). 
144 HEATH & HEATH, supra note 140, at 95-97, 146, 168. 
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process itself.”145 By explicitly encouraging an experimentalist approach to 
regulation, Congress can change this dynamic and evaluate innovative 
regulatory experiments before codifying, refining, tolerating, or rejecting them. 
A core failing of our current regulatory system is its inability to generate and 
evaluate regulatory experiments. To make this point, Professor Michael 
Greenstone contrasts the process for evaluating prospective drugs—experiments 
through randomized trials—with regulation (including those used to oversee 
drug safety).146 Unlike drug evaluation trials, the process for evaluating 
regulations is currently all at the front end. Put differently, our regulatory system 
is unduly wedded to the traditional model of regulation (often an exclusively 
front end, before-the-fact, process) and, insofar as we evaluate regulatory 
effectiveness at all, the process for doing so is similarly front-loaded (as opposed 
to after-the-fact).147 
In encouraging experimentation in the public sector, it is important that 
Congress recognize the impact of private regulatory efforts. Consider, for 
example, that the Energy Star program could have been developed by a private 
entity and the LEED standard could have been developed by the EPA. And even 
where a private (or public) effort initially succeeds, continued success can only 
be assured by a culture of continuous improvement through entrepreneurial 
leadership.148 
The Australian Office of Best Practices (“AOBP”) is a model of constant 
commitment to experimentation and evaluation. Whereas the United States’ 
Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (“OIRA”) is focused on the analysis of regulatory strategies before they 
are adopted (notably, whether they are justified on cost-benefit analysis 
 
145 COGLIANESE, supra note 6, at 7. 
146 See Greenstone, supra note 139, at 114-18; Wansley, supra note 11, at 430-36 
(suggesting model of randomized trials for evaluating experimental regulatory initiatives). 
147 The limited, after-the-fact analysis of new initiatives is particularly problematic 
because of the limits of notice-and-comment rulemaking as a means of gathering effective 
and reliable data. See Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Essay, An Options Approach to Agency 
Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 881, 892 (2013) (“[T]he agency seldom has all the necessary 
information to understand the intricacies of any industry.”); see generally Wendy E. Wagner, 
Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2010) 
(examining flaws and biases of traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
148 For private sector efforts, there is always the threat that “[t]o the extent that standards 
are not maintained, the value of a label is undermined and consumer demand declines.” Tracey 
M. Roberts, The Rise of Rule Four Institutions: Voluntary Standards, Certification and 
Labeling Systems, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107, 154 (2013); see Sally Eden, The Work of 
Environmental Governance Networks, 40 GEOFORUM 383, 392 (2009) (“[G]overnance 
networks are not given nor guaranteed power, but remain precarious and must be continually 
(re)produced, standardised, and normalised through complex networking, often against 
competing networks.” (citations omitted)). 
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grounds),149 the AOBP investigates the impact of regulatory initiatives in 
practice.150 In another model, the U.K. Behavioral Insights team is an impressive 
case study of continuous improvement applied to government.151 In the private 
regulatory arena, the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and 
Labeling (“ISEAL”) Alliance has a similar mission, spearheading an effort to 
enable its members to improve their programs and learn from one another.152 In 
particular, this initiative calls for the “establishment of monitoring and 
evaluation programs; the definition of the intended change; establishment of 
appropriate indicators; data collection and evaluation; evaluation reports; and 
learning and improvement.”153 
The hardest cultural challenge for government is to develop the ability to 
admit that an experiment did not work.154 The incentives are not only against 
experimentation,155 but they also weigh against acknowledging that an 
experiment failed. Indeed, cognitive bias itself can influence whether evaluators 
 
149 Greenstone, supra note 139, at 111-12, 121 (“[O]ur regulatory system all too frequently 
takes shots in the dark and we all too infrequently fail to find out if we have hit anything—or 
even worse, we only find out when things have gone horribly wrong.”); Michael A. 
Livermore, A Brief Comment on “Humanizing Cost-Benefit Analysis,” 2 EUR. J. RISK REG. 
13, 16 (2011) (“[R]etrospective reviews have never been a priority, despite calls from a range 
of commentators across the political spectrum.”). 
150 Best Practice Regulation, DEP’T PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET, https://www.pmc.gov. 
au/regulation/best-practice-regulation [https://perma.cc/X3VD-9SJM] (last visited Nov. 17, 
2017). 
151 Who We Are, BEHAV. INSIGHTS TEAM, http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/ about-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/TN4T-Q2MQ] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
152 Our Mission, ISEAL ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/about-us/our-mission 
[https://perma.cc/9HSF-7RUK] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). “The ISEAL Alliance was 
founded in 2002 by a pioneering group of sustainability standard-setters,” including the FSC 
and the MSC. Our History, ISEAL ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/about-us/our-
history [https://perma.cc/9GAJ-D3ZH] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). ISEAL initially stood for 
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance, but  now it is 
ISEAL alone. Id. 
153 Colin Scott, Evaluating the Performance and Accountability of Regulators, 37 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 353, 370-71 (2014). 
154 MICHAEL MANDEL & DIANA G. CAREW, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., REGULATORY 
IMPROVEMENT COMMISSION: A POLITICALLY-VIABLE APPROACH TO U.S. REGULATORY 
REFORM 13 (2013), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/05.2013-
Mandel-Carew_Regulatory-Improvement-Commission_A-Politically-Viable-Approach-to-
US-Regulatory-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WVG-UZPE] (noting challenge of critically 
evaluating past efforts as calling “unwanted attention to all of their regulations and programs, 
and potentially rais[ing] embarrassing questions”). 
155 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of 
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 787 (“Agency heads and 
politicians rarely brag about the number of rules they have cut or amended so as to reduce 
regulation. It is the new initiatives that get people’s attention.” (footnote omitted)). 
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judge regulatory initiatives successful or not.156 To build a culture of 
retrospection is thus not enough; that culture must also—perhaps aided by 
outside perspectives—embrace harsh feedback and accept failure (at least when 
resulting from competent administration) as a normal and valuable data point. 
A culture of retrospection requires leadership that embraces critical 
thinking.157 This mindset embraces both the trial and the error parts of “trial-
and-error,” allowing new ideas to be tried and errors to be accepted as an 
inevitable part of the process.158 It also calls for rigorous evaluation of what is 
working—and what is not working—about a regime in practice.159 
Legislators and regulators around the world continue to look for models to 
spur more effective and honest evaluation of regulatory programs in practice. To 
drive a culture of honest re-examination in a particular agency takes 
considerable vigilance and a willingness to re-examine the impact of past 
programs. To aid such efforts, the European Union has developed a set of 
“Impact Assessment” guidelines.160 In a recent attempt to spur such behavior 
across the government, President Obama signed an executive order calling for 
retrospectively evaluating the effectiveness of regulations.161 Reflecting the 
skepticism about this and similar efforts,162 some commentators have called for 
 
156 Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 89, at 591 (“Cognitive biases can operate as insidiously 
in the evaluation of regulatory policy as in its design.”); see DAN ARIELY, THE UPSIDE OF 
IRRATIONALITY: THE UNEXPECTED BENEFITS OF DEFYING LOGIC AT WORK AND AT HOME 109-
22 (2010) (explaining how, once we create something, “we feel an increased sense of 
ownership—and we begin to overvalue the usefulness and the importance of ‘our’ ideas”). 
157 Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, Making Dumb Groups Smarter, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Dec. 2014, at 90, 98 (“So if the leader of a group encourages information disclosure from the 
beginning, even if it goes against the grain, members will probably do less self-silencing.”). 
158 Until certain experiments are tried, it will be far from clear how they will turn out. See 
Vernon L. Smith, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 
465, 472 (2003) (explaining how some breakthroughs “had to be discovered through market 
experimentation”). 
159 See Michael Lewis, Bond of Brilliance, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2016, at 132, 177 
(discussing Danny Kahnemans’s insights generated for Israeli Army by examining what food 
soldiers ate and did not eat). A close cousin of this approach is to observe how a regime 
operates in parallel contexts. See STEVEN KELLMAN, UNLEASHING CHANGE: A STUDY OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL RENEWAL IN GOVERNMENT 19 (2005) (noting that government procurement 
reform can be guided by how successful private firms manage procurement). 
160 See European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, at 3, SEC (2009) 92 final 
(Jan. 15, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/ 
iag_2009_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN9G-ZYJ4]. 
161 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011); Memorandum from 
Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Exec. Office of the President, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & 
Agencies 1 (Apr. 25, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/ 
memoranda/2011/m11-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZE7-XCMF]. 
162 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 155, at 778 (commenting that past state initiatives have 
had “decidedly mixed” results); see JOSEPH E. ALDY, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, 
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other structural innovations to facilitate more effective reexaminations of 
regulatory effectiveness.163 
This Article calls for entrepreneurial leadership and the development of an 
agency culture that advances such retrospectives with a level of seriousness and 
rigor.164 In most cases, agencies engage in an auto-pilot, check-the-box approach 
to such matters.165 By contrast, agencies that create a learning culture are able to 
continuously evaluate the impact of policy experiments, improve them, and 
learn from the experience.166 To drive such cultures, Congress can choose to 
acknowledge and defer to those agencies that take this process seriously; 
 
LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF AGENCY 
RULES AND THE EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATORY 
POLICY 4 (2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Aldy%2520Retro% 
2520Review%2520Draft%252011-17-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYT3-X2UH] (“[T]he 
federal government has a mixed track record on retrospective review of existing rules.”); Cary 
Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 57, 60 (2013) 
(expressing skepticism about likely effectiveness of Obama Administration’s retrospective 
effort). 
163 E.g., Reeve T. Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and 
Rulemaking Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 113 (2015) (calling for “collaborative 
alternatives”); Mandel & Carew, supra note 154, at 2 (calling for regulatory improvement 
commission). 
164 This is the approach for which Professor Cass Sunstein has advocated. See CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 150, 172, 215 (2013) (explaining power of 
cost-benefit analysis as way to unearth errors and enable their correction); Cass Sunstein, 
Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Regulation: Looking Backward, Looking 
Forward 2 (May 10, 2012) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/speeches/regulation-looking-backward-looking-forward-0510 
2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q28L-3GCW]) (“Regulatory systems need their own Billy Beanes 
and Paul DePodestas[, the heroes of the book, Moneyball], avoiding anecdotes and intuitions, 
and instead carefully assessing what rules will do before the fact and testing them after the 
fact.”). In a sign of the importance of building such a mindset, agencies reported to the 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) that retrospectives were more successful when 
they followed from their own discretionary reviews rather than from mandates to perform 
them. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-791, REEXAMINING REGULATIONS: 
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSPARENCY OF RETROSPECTIVE 
REVIEWS 6 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07791.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BDR-
A6XK]. 
165 See Braithwaite, supra note 33, at 512 (“Regulatory practice tends to accept far too 
readily presumptions that extant regulatory frameworks already have the right answers. The 
law is often taken as self-evidently right; rational choice presumptions about how actors 
respond to deterrence are ingrained in the face of the evidence we have that defiance often 
exceeds deterrence effects.”). 
166 See id. at 513-14 (examining concept of triple-loop learning, “where lessons about how 
to revise regulatory goals and strategies are looped across all such organizations throughout 
the economy,” and claiming that “more systematic approach to tripling loops of learning could 
be one of the more cost-effective investments regulators can make in improvement”). 
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recognize failed experiments, displaying more skepticism to those agencies that 
fail to evaluate their work carefully; or refuse to recognize failed experiments. 
B. Legitimacy and Adherence to Public Norms 
The legitimacy of agency actions (or private sector ones) depends on their 
legal authority to act and their compliance with traditional administrative law 
norms (even when not formally required). For both public agencies and private 
entities, it is thus important that they establish their legitimacy, develop 
standards of conduct, and enforce them by following fair and acceptable 
processes.167 This Section first discusses public agencies’ legal authority to act 
and then explains how both public agencies and private entities must follow 
traditional law norms to establish and maintain legitimacy. 
1. Legal Authority to Act 
For public agencies, it is essential that any experimentation fits within their 
legal authority to act. Where agencies act contrary to their enabling legislation, 
they can be properly accused of going rogue.168 In a classic scholarly treatment 
of this point, McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (known collectively as 
“McNollgast”) have argued that congressionally-imposed structures and 
procedures ensure that agencies stick to the path envisioned by Congress.169 On 
this view, these restrictions address the “principal-agent” problem that occurs 
when Congress legislates with one purpose in mind and agencies take another 
course.170 
 
167 See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 
706 (1988) (“[I]n a community organized around rules, compliance is secured—to whatever 
degree it is—at least in part by perception of a rule as legitimate by those to whom it is 
addressed.”); see also Meidinger, supra note 8, at 287 (“Ultimately multi-interest self-
governance systems must prove themselves legitimate—that is, socially accepted and 
expected—if they are to persist.”). 
168 It is axiomatic that “an agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until 
Congress confers power upon it.” La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986). 
169 More particularly, the McNollgast argument is that legislation reflects a victory by a 
winning coalition and Congress needs to impose structures on agency administration—
including notice-and-comment requirements—to protect the interests of that coalition. See 
Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics 
and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 431, 481-82 (1989) (arguing that procedural requirements and structure “can provide 
effective control over agency decisions”). 
170 Terry M. Moe, Delegation, Control, and the Study of Public Bureaucracy, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 1148, 1154-55 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts 
eds., 2013) (“The problem arises because the typical agency has its own policy preferences, 
often different from those of Congress, and because it may be able to use the information 
asymmetry built into their relationship—owing to its greater expertise—to go its own way in 
policy.”). 
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First, it is important to appreciate that the range of cases and the use of 
experimental regulations envisioned in this Article will mostly arise in cases 
where agencies possess broad authority without specific authorizations to act.171 
In cases where regulatory agencies are specifically barred from proceeding in a 
particular area, they cannot take action, experimental or otherwise. In cases 
where they are specifically authorized to act, there is no cause for concern. The 
most interesting cases are ones where the agency possesses broad authority, but 
Congress has not specifically called on the agency to act. 
The value of allowing administrative agencies some degree of “common-law-
like” authority is that they can address emerging issues as they arise rather than 
await specific congressional authorization.172 In the Energy Star initiative, for 
example, the EPA lacked authority to enact formal regulations, but possessed 
broad authority to encourage energy efficiency.173 In that case, Congress 
monitored the agency’s actions, providing budgetary authority for its efforts, and 
ultimately endorsed the initiative by specifically authorizing it.174 
 
171 As Jerry Mashaw has explained, the tradition of conferring broad authority to agencies 
goes back to the early days of the Republic. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 290-91 (2012) (noting that like many statutes today, early statutes, such 
as those establishing Departments of War and State in first Congress, provided “broad 
delegations” of discretionary authority to administrative officers). The cynical take on this 
practice is that Congress adopts general policies so that it can take credit for acting, but avoid 
taking responsibility for specific results. See Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of 
Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 46-52 
(1982). A more generous view is that Congress may not know specifically what it wants to 
do, but agrees that the ability to act is important. See Glen O. Robinson, Commentary on 
“Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Political Uses of 
Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV. 483, 485 (1989) (asserting that congressional 
delegation of broad discretion to agencies can often “reflect the fact that coalition members 
cannot agree on pertinent policy outcomes but can agree that delegating policymaking power 
to an agency is preferable to legislative stymie”). 
172 Sunstein interprets the canonical Chevron case in just this fashion, explaining that 
“[o]perating as common law courts, agencies have, as they should, considerable power to 
adapt statutory language to changing understandings and circumstances.” Cass R. Sunstein, 
Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 
1019 (1998). 
173 Another challenge, not explored in this Article, is how to address the situation where 
multiple agencies possess plausible claims to address an issue and seek to do so at the same 
time. In the case of Energy Star, where the DOE had a claim to authority as well, the EPA 
ultimately brought that agency into the program and the two agencies have collaborated on it 
ever since. See Energy Star, supra note 1. 
174 See 42 U.S.C. § 6294(a)(1) (2012). There is considerable debate and uncertainty on the 
effectiveness of congressional oversight. See Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, The 
Politics of Regulation: From New Institutionalism to New Governance, 14 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 107, 110 (2011) (“In fact, even today the extent to which Congress effectively oversees 
agency activities remains unclear.”); id. at 111-12 (finding varying impact of congressional 
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The McNollgast theory focuses on the concern that an agency will depart from 
its envisioned direction by going rogue, but the theory ignores the risk that the 
agency will depart from congressional intent by failing to act effectively.175 
Recent scholarship suggests that these two goals—cabining agency discretion 
and encouraging agency effectiveness—are in tension with one another.176 With 
respect to the focus on structural safeguards to prevent unwanted agency action, 
Professor Terry Moe suggested that “bureaucracies should tend to be less 
burdened with structures that, in the American system, make it difficult for 
agencies to do their jobs.”177 To that end, Moe criticizes the assumption—made 
by McNollgast and others—that bureaucratic expertise and capacity can be 
assumed. In contrast, invoking an article by Gailmard and Patty, Moe argues that 
providing for a degree of agency discretion will lead to superior performance.178 
Relying on after-the-fact review by Congress is far from perfect. In most 
cases, the budget authorization process provides an important check on agency 
action and can ensure the legitimacy of agency experiments. Nonetheless, there 
may well be cases where information asymmetries between Congress and 
administrative agencies allow some programs to remain under the radar.179 This 
 
oversight, but noting that “congressional oversight and appropriations decisions have been 
found to be important predictors of activity levels at the EPA and other agencies through the 
late 1980s”). 
175 Steve Croley offers this criticism of the McNollgast theory. Steven P. Croley, Public 
Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 34 (2000) (“Another difficulty with the 
McNollgast view is its implicit suggestion that agencies defy Congress—upset proper 
legislative coalitions—only through action, not inaction.”). 
176 Moe, supra note 170, at 1158 (“The McNollgast theory is about what Congress can do 
to prevent runaway bureaucracy, which is an important issue. . . . The presumption seems to 
be that, as long as agencies are under control and prevented from drifting, they will perform 
effectively and constituents will get their benefits.”). 
177 Id. at 1159. 
178 Id. at 1170-71 (discussing Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil 
Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 882-84 
(2007)). Stated simply, Gailmard & Patty explain that “only those with a stake in policy can 
be induced (by the limited instruments available) to become experts.” Gailmard & Patty, 
supra, at 886. The same analysis can also apply to the case of how much discretion the White 
House should allow to agencies to develop and implement regulatory initiatives. Gillian E. 
Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of 
Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 434 (2009) (“Presidents may well be willing to forego 
politicization or centralization and opt for a form of administration they can less easily control 
if they believe that doing so will yield more effective performance.”). 
179 On the McNollgast view, it was not necessarily information asymmetries that raised 
this concern, but that a winning coalition that pushed the original legislation might fracture in 
the face of a different outcome at the administrative agency, thereby undermining Congress’s 
ability to push for its original policy preference after-the-fact. See McCubbins et al., supra 
note 169, at 435-40. To the extent that this dynamic could take hold, however, it would apply 
only in situations where the policy outcome was clearly zero-sum, with concrete winners and 
losers. In many cases, including the case studies discussed in Part III, this premise does not 
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concern should not be overstated, however, as like in the Energy Star case, 
Congress plainly engages in after-the-fact oversight.180 Moreover, to the extent 
that agencies believe that such oversight is possible, they may well internalize 
congressional concerns and avoid controversy by declining to act outside of their 
mandates.181 
2. Compliance with Traditional Administrative Law Norms 
For regulatory initiatives managed by private bodies (or even for public 
agencies acting outside formal processes), there is a basic question as to whether 
they comply with traditional administrative law norms. With respect to standard 
setting, the federal government has long required that “official” standard setting 
bodies—that is, those developing voluntary consensus standards used or 
supported by the government—must operate based on a set of norms related to 
openness and transparency. In particular, the Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”) has explained that such bodies should adhere to the following: 
(1) openness, (2) balance of interest, (3) due process, (4) a review/appeals 
process, and (5) a commitment to developing consensus.182 By following these 
principles, the OMB suggests, such bodies can develop legitimacy.183 Similarly, 
when governments rely on third party certification regimes, the best practice is 
to ensure that they operate openly and transparently.184 
 
hold. A more powerful reason to doubt the ability of Congress to engage in after-the-fact 
review is that its practice of establishing multiple agencies with oversight jurisdiction—
thereby creating a “multiplicity of legislative principals”—can undermine “the control they 
have collectively over a bureaucratic agent.” Sean Gailmard, Multiple Principals and 
Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making, 21 J. THEORETICAL POL. 161, 181 (2009). 
180 Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review, 43 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 95, 125-27 (2014) (contending oversight of FTC in early- and late-1970s 
influenced agency behavior). 
181 Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW 333, 335 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (“A rational 
agency might prefer to maintain rigid control over existing jurisdiction or avoid entering into 
regulatory domains that will prove especially controversial . . . .”); id. at 336 (explaining 
“under-reaching” by agencies on ground that they might well prefer to “maximize autonomy 
instead of regulatory authority”). 
182 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-119, 
FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS 
STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES 16 (2014), https://www.white 
house.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A119/revised_circular_a-119_as_of_1_ 
22.pdf [https://perma.cc/92RE-UE2H]. 
183 Id. at 14-16. 
184 LESLEY K. MCCALLISTER, THIRD-PARTY PROGRAMS TO ASSESS REGULATORY 
COMPLIANCE (PRELIMINARY DRAFT) 47 (2012) https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/Draft-Report-on-Third-Party-Programs-to-Assess-Regulatory-Compliance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2AS4-ELKG] (highlighting importance of transparency and accountability 
to protect public confidence in such third-party programs); see Daniel C. Esty, Good 
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As a foundational matter, the values of due process—namely, notice and the 
opportunity to be heard—are fundamental to the administrative state. To be 
successful, experimental regulatory programs must take these values 
seriously.185 Similarly, the administrative law tradition of providing reasoned 
justifications for decisions—even if not subject to judicial review—is a healthy 
practice for public agencies and private entities developing new regulatory 
initiatives.186 By adhering to such norms, both public agencies and private 
entities can earn legitimacy. 
For private entities, membership structure is a critical step to building 
legitimacy.187 Initially, when the World Wildlife Fund and Unilever founded the 
MSC program, it was criticized as tilted toward industry and insufficiently 
transparent and participatory.188 Responding to these criticisms, the MSC 
became an independent non-profit organization in 1998 and took governance 
issues very seriously, instituting requirements that “enhance[d] participation, 
representation, and transparency.”189 Moreover, in 2001, after further 
governance review, the MSC instituted a series of measures to facilitate its 
responsiveness to a range of stakeholders, including the addition of a technical 
advisory board, a stakeholder council, and national and regional working 
groups.190 
 
Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 
1490, 1527-37 (2006) (setting out best practices for governance and asserting that “a 
procedurally sophisticated rulemaking process promotes political debate and decisionmaking 
based on reasoned analysis and, thus, enhances deliberative legitimacy”). 
185 For discussions of this point, see McAllister, supra note 19, at 404 (“The development 
of program rules and guidance [of a private regulatory regime] should include public notice 
and participation.”); Weiser, supra note 35, at 577 (calling for such experimental regulatory 
programs to adopt “commitment to transparency, open participation (at least on specified 
terms), [and] periodic exit rights for members”). 
186 The classic administrative law case on point is Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (requiring agency to 
“examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action”). 
187 To develop that credibility, as explained by Ofcom, the organization must include the 
right mix of membership. See OFFICE OF COMM’CNS, INITIAL ASSESSMENTS OF WHEN TO 
ADOPT SELF- OR CO-REGULATION § 4.3(h), 12 (2008) (U.K.), https://www.ofcom.org.uk/ 
__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/41806/condoc.pdf [https://perma.cc/VMN8-67CE] (considering 
“a system involving a mixture of independent lay and industry members [to] be appropriate 
in both the [self-regulatory] scheme’s governing body and further operating committees” and 
necessary to garner respect of stakeholder groups). 
188 Martijn W. Scheltema, Assessing Effectiveness of International Private Regulation in 
the CSR Arena, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 310-11 (2014). 
189 Id. 
190 Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Accountability Arrangements in Non-State Standards 
Organizations: Instrumental Design and Imitation, 15 ORG. 563, 572 (2008). The MSC is still 
led by a self-perpetuating board of trustees. Id. 
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The Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”),191 which provided the basic model 
for the MSC, uses a very sophisticated governance structure and enjoys a 
competitive advantage on that account.192 Under the FSC’s charter, social, 
economic, and environmental concerns have equal weight.193 In the face of 
adopting stricter standards than some industry participants believed appropriate, 
industry interests sought to establish rival certification programs.194 Those 
programs, however, were forced to adjust their governance models “to accept 
some degree of scrutiny from and answerability to outside stakeholders” in order 
to compete with “FSC for legitimacy and rule-making authority.”195 This 
development suggests that governance norms around transparency, 
participation, and accountability are becoming de rigeur for trusted multi-
stakeholder organizations.196 Ideally, such safeguards can limit the risk of public 
choice pressures and industry capture in multi-stakeholder organizations.197 
Even with diverse membership, multi-stakeholder organizations must take 
affirmative steps to address the “[c]oncerns about the uneven capacity of 
 
191 Like the MSC, the FSC focuses on sustainability, articulating its mission as providing 
principles and criteria for “environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, and economically 
viable forest management.” The 10 FSC Principles, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL https://ic. 
fsc.org/en/what-is-fsc-certification/principles-criteria/fscs-10-principles [https://perma.cc/W 
79D-S4PY] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
192 Scheltema, supra note 188, at 311. 
193 Id. (“[The FSC] established a tripartite governance structure composed of social, 
environmental, and economic chambers which have equal voting rights. In each chamber 
there are north and south sub chambers with equal voting rights regardless of the number of 
members.”); see Meidinger, supra note 83, at 53 (“The FSC’s international governing body, 
the General Assembly, is constituted of three chambers—economic, social and 
environmental—with equal voting power. These chambers are further divided into Northern 
(developed country) and Southern (developing country) sub-chambers, each also holding 
equal decisional power . . . .”). 
194 Gulbrandsen, supra note 190, at 572. 
195 Id. at 572; see Meidinger, supra note 83, at 55 (noting that FSC rival, Sustainable 
Forestry Initiative, “has since gone through numerous other iterations, gradually getting 
stronger and more detailed, and eventually being placed under the control of a nominally 
independent multi-stakeholder board”). 
196 See Gulbrandsen, supra note 190, at 575 (making this argument and concluding that 
“accountability structures are most developed in FSC and MSC, whereas certification 
proceedings in industry-dominated schemes tend to be less demanding, transparent and open 
to outside stakeholders”); Errol Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation: How 
Could It Be Democratic?, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 513, 517 (2008) (“Most programs now provide 
for multi-stakeholder participation, notice-and-comment processes for rulemaking and 
adjudication, public responses to comments and explanation of decisions, . . . and similar 
practices characterizing modern administrative regulation.”); see also Lytton, supra note 143, 
at 547 (explaining how UL built up “its reputation for trustworthiness through transparency”). 
197 In praising such structures, one commentator went so far as to suggest that they are 
resistant to such practices and “more directly democratic” than traditional regulatory 
institutions. Roberts, supra note 148, at 140. 
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different stakeholders to participate.”198 To be sure, this concern is equally 
applicable to traditional administrative processes conducted by public 
agencies.199 With respect to providing voices to different groups, the leaders of 
multi-stakeholder processes should be aware that not all groups are equally well 
positioned to participate and there are measures—such as the ones taken by the 
FSC200—that can ensure all perspectives are heard before important decisions 
are made. Given that such measures may well require funding those who cannot 
otherwise participate, this challenge threatens to become an Achilles heel for 
any multi-stakeholder organization. 
C. Accountability 
To ensure that a regulatory regime is successful, it must hold regulated firms 
accountable. For agencies or entities that lack the tools to punish non-
compliance with a regulatory standard, the risk is that opportunistic behavior, 
whether cheating on the rule or free-riding by not making the investments 
necessary for full compliance, will become the norm. As sociological studies 
show, where firms believe that compliance is the norm, they are far more likely 
to comply; by contrast, the belief that others are cheating encourages non-
 
198 Nick Doty & Deidre K. Mulligan, Internet Multistakeholder Processes and Techno-
Policy Standards, 11 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 135, 163, 181 (2013) (examining multi-
stakeholder effort on internet privacy and noting need for “additional measures to ensure 
effective participation by diverse stakeholders”); see Waz & Weiser, supra note 63, at 344 
(“With greater openness to members, [multistakeholder] bodies must . . . minimize the risk of 
forum-packing, which can become a challenge when an organization’s ground rules permit 
disproportionate representation that may introduce dimensions of politics into its process.”). 
199 Lytton, supra note 143, at 569 (noting private entity certification efforts that “compare 
favorably in terms of participation, transparency, and accountability with notice-and-
comment rulemaking”); Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The 
Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 463, 464 (2012) (“Empirical evidence indicates that industry interests 
dominate the rulemaking process in a number of important areas of social regulation, with no 
public interest representation at all in many rulemakings.”); Wendy Wagner, Katherine 
Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic 
Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 119, 152 (2011) (examining “interest group 
participation and influence during three stages of the rulemaking process for one set of highly 
technical rules promulgated by EPA” and concluding that “imbalanced participation” from 
industry and public interest groups is prevalent). 
200 Meidinger, supra note 196, at 527 (noting that FSC tried to “provide resources and 
venues” to allow less-endowed interests to join in discussions). 
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compliance.201 Consequently, a common response to potential cheating is to 
require auditing or certification of the regulated standard of conduct.202 
As this Section discusses, there are a range of different auditing, certification, 
and oversight regimes to encourage compliance. For self-regulatory initiatives, 
it is often the case that “the presence or absence of public monitoring is 
critical.”203 And the design of such regimes matters. In the best of cases, 
effective oversight can ensure vigilant compliance, leveraging public disclosure 
as a tool and incentive.204 In the worst cases, the compliance regime encourages 
check-the-box thinking and conduct that misleads the public as to whether a firm 
is meaningfully compliant.205 
A fundamental challenge for private regimes that rely on outside oversight is 
the potential conflict of interest facing auditors and certification bodies. As one 
commentator explained, the goal of such programs is for the “certifier” to 
operate as a “trustworthy expert who can verify for outsiders that a firm is 
performing to [a] standard” of conduct and be analogous to a hearing officer or 
government inspector.206 The big difference and challenge is that auditors and 
certification bodies are selected and paid for by the regulated firm. When 
structured well, such as the MSC,207 a successful program can operate 
effectively and manage the potential conflicts of interest, ensure sufficient 
transparency, and promote accountability.208 In other cases, however, the 
 
201 See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 341-43 
(2001) (“In sum, individuals behave like amoral calculators posited by the conventional 
theory only when they believe that others are cheaters; if they believe that others are morally 
motivated to comply, they reciprocate by complying in turn, whether or not they believe that 
they could profitably evade.”). 
202 But see id. at 343 (“But because stepped up enforcement efforts supply no assurance 
that citizens can trust others to pay their taxes, they are unlikely to promote the reciprocal 
cooperation necessary to sustain high compliance levels.”). 
203 Weiser, supra note 35, at 552; see AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 16, at 33 (noting 
salutary effect of oversight and “claim[ing] that business actors are likely to put forward a self 
that they, the regulator and the researcher observing them, are all likely to view as their 
socially responsible self”); Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More 
Than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 
387 (2010) (concluding that self-regulation without oversight can be abused by poor 
compliers “as window dressing” and that threat of punishment in background is healthy). 
204 McAllister, supra note 19, at 314. 
205 Friederike Albersmeier et al., The Reliability of Third-Party Certification in the Food 
Chain: From Checklists to Risk-Oriented Auditing, 20 FOOD CONTROL 927, 928-30 (2009) 
(explaining risk-assessment-based auditing versus checklist-based auditing); see Alexia 
Brunet Marks, A New Governance Recipe for Food Safety Regulation, 47 LOYOLA U. CHI. 
L.J. 907, 960-61 (2016) (discussing this concern in context of food safety regulation). 
206 E.g., Meidinger, supra note 8, at 267. 
207 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
208 In statutory regimes that call for third-party audits, Congress generally institutes 
requirements for managing conflict of interest concerns, including oversight of those charged 
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potential for conflicts of interest and the need to develop safeguards against them 
is neglected.209 In short, it is crucial that programs ensure effective oversight lest 
participants begin to see compliance as optional and non-compliance as the 
norm.210 
The risks to initiatives without strong safeguards against cheating underscores 
the importance of a robust accreditation regime. As for the MSC case discussed 
above, formally accredited bodies oversee and certify the results of purportedly 
independent auditors.211 To guide such oversight, the International Organization 
for Standardization (“ISO”) has developed a standardized approach to 
“conformity assessment,”212 explaining the two key elements of this model: 
(1) certification and (2) accreditation.213 Notably, the ultimate authority (say, a 
governmental agency like the EPA) selects the accreditation body (or bodies) to 
accredit responsible auditors and to certify audits as a means of ensuring 
compliance with the regulatory regime.214 With an independent accreditation 
 
with accrediting the auditors. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 205, at 936-40 (discussing Food 
Safety Modernization Act’s third party auditing regime); McAllister, supra note 19, at 335-
38 (same). 
209 Notably, in some programs, there is “little transparency in the inspection activities of 
the auditors hired by commercial buyers to check on their suppliers.” Lesley K. McAllister, 
Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 34 (2012). In such cases, where 
third-party auditors are arranged for and paid for by the regulated firm with little oversight, 
the relationship is “rife with potential for abuse.” Margaret Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-
Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 334 
(2008). 
210 See OFFICE OF COMMC’N, supra note 35, at 22 (emphasizing importance of “openness 
and transparency in operation, and a degree of public accountability in relation to the scheme’s 
performance”); Julien Etienne, Compliance Theory: A Goal Framing Approach, 33 LAW & 
POL’Y 305, 316 (2011) (explaining how perceptions of institutional environment shape 
attitudes toward compliance). 
211 See McAllister, supra note 209, at 2 (“With third-party verification, regulated entities 
are required to contract with a ‘verifier’ or ‘verification body’ to make a regulatory 
compliance determination.”). 
212 The American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) is recognized by ISO as the 
“official U.S. representative.” About ANSI, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., 
https://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/overview?menuid=1 [https://perma.cc/WWA5-
NC6P] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). ANSI defines “conformity assessment” as the 
“demonstration that specified requirements relating to a product, process, system, person, or 
body are fulfilled.” AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., UNITED STATES CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT 
PRINCIPLES 3, 5 (3d ed. 2007), https://share.ansi.org/shared%20documents/News%20and%20 
Publications/Brochures/USCAP%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GYR-6XY9]. 
213 For a discussion of conformity assessment, see McAllister, supra note 19, at 310-12 
(explaining development of standardized conformity assessment and detailing different forms 
of assessment, including testing, inspection, certification, and accreditation). 
214 See id. at 312 (“Accreditation bodies may be public or private entities, and some 
countries have one or more private accreditation bodies in addition to or instead of a national 
accreditation body. Accreditation bodies, in turn, are often members of either the International 
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body in place, auditors cannot take for granted that pleasing the regulated firm 
is their only obligation (other than professional norms); rather, they must 
consider whether their work will be accepted and whether they can maintain 
their accreditation.215 Moreover, making the certification decision and firm 
performance data public provides both an incentive for firm improvement as 
well as a basis for other outside parties to scrutinize the certification decision.216 
The value of an effective accreditation system is underscored by the 
experience of the Energy Star program. In the early 1990s, the EPA, in an 
innovative regulatory experiment, developed a voluntary program for 
electronics manufacturers to label their programs with a “certification mark” 
(Energy Star) that signaled that the products were energy efficient.217 On a 
number of levels, the program has succeeded, “sav[ing] American families and 
businesses 503 billion kWh of energy and $34 billion on their energy bills in 
2015 alone” and catalyzing the “purchase [of] more than 300 million Energy 
Star certified products in 2015.”218 For consumers, the brand is both familiar 
(“seventy-six percent of households reported a high understanding of the 
ENERGY STAR label in 2015”)219 and powerful (fifty-two percent of 
consumers in non-high-publicity areas in 2015 reported that they were “‘very 
much’ influenced by the label after recognizing it and purchasing an ENERGY 
STAR-labeled product”).220 Finally, building on this model and working with 
 
Accreditation Forum (IAF) or the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation 
(ILAC), which require adherence to international standards for accreditation bodies and use a 
system of peer evaluation to assess accreditation bodies for membership.” (footnote omitted)). 
215 See id. (explaining that objective of independent accreditation “is that conformity 
assessment bodies accredited by member accreditation bodies will be recognized as 
competent in multiple jurisdictions and markets”). 
216 See Meidinger, supra note 83, at 71-73 (noting that FSC reviews “accreditation 
decisions of certifiers, with the option of suspending or revoking their status as certifiers if 
problems occur,” and uses transparency of certification proceedings as check on certifiers). 
217 See Fla. Citrus Comm’n, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 495, 499 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (“A 
certification mark is a special creature created for a purpose uniquely different from that of 
an ordinary service mark or trademark.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 11 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
218 About ENERGY STAR, ENERGY STAR, (footnote omitted) https://www.energystar.gov/ 
about [https://perma.cc/SYG6-3C8W] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
219 EPA OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, CLIMATE PROTECTION P’SHIPS DIV., NATIONAL 
AWARENESS OF ENERGY STAR FOR 2015: ANALYSIS OF 2015 CEE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ES-







220 Id. at 21. 
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the EPA, other countries, including Canada, New Zealand, and Taiwan, as well 
as the European Union, adopted the Energy Star program for certain products.221 
For most of its history, the Energy Star program relied on manufacturers to 
self-declare compliance, with no requirement for independent third-party 
certification and very limited oversight to guard against false reporting.222 After 
a Consumer Reports analysis223 and a Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) investigation highlighted the flaws of this approach, including a GAO 
audit that reported that fifteen out of twenty non-qualifying products submitted 
for review were accepted by the EPA,224 the EPA agreed to change the structure 
of the program.225 Energy Star labeling now requires testing in an accredited 
laboratory and certified results (by an accredited certification body) that are sent 
to the EPA.226 Moreover, Energy Star audits product certifications to ensure that 
they are being managed properly and the accreditation system now requires the 
accreditation bodies to conduct periodic assessments of the certification bodies 
they oversee.227 Applications for the Energy Star label have not fallen off despite 
the rising compliance costs, signaling the program’s value.228 
 
221 ENERGY STAR International Partners, ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/ 
index.cfm?c=partners.intl_implementation [https://perma.cc/2BLT-DJHW] (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2017). 
222 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-470, ENERGY STAR PROGRAM: COVERT 
TESTING SHOWS THE ENERGY STAR PROGRAM CERTIFICATION PROCESS IS VULNERABLE TO 
FRAUD AND ABUSE 6 (2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10470.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
DX9B-H6ZR]. 
223 See id. at 7 (“[A]n October 2008 issue of Consumer Reports detailed further problems 
[with the Energy Star certification program], including lax qualifying standards, federal 
testing procedures that were outpaced by current technology, and reliance on industry self-
policing . . . without evidence of the effectiveness of that approach.”); Ryan Davis, ‘Energy 
Star’ Claims May Be Misleading: Study, LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2008), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/69886 (“Consumer Reports also faulted the program for allowing companies to self-
certify that their products comply with the standards, since the EPA does not test any products 
itself. As a result, there is no independent verification of what the manufacturers report.”). 
224 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 222, at 8; see id. at 17 (“Our ability 
to obtain product certifications with unverified test results illustrates the need for, at a 
minimum, some level of third-party testing for the program to be one of certification versus 
self-certification.”). 
225 Memorandum from Cathy Zoi, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, & Gina 
McCarthy, Assistant Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Steven Chu, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Energy, & Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, on Building a Stronger Energy 
Star Program para. 2 (Apr. 2, 2010), https://www.energystar.gov/ia/news/downloads/Joint_ 
Letter_with_DOE_EPA_Building_a_Stronger_Energy_Star_Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
ES7Y-GB6C]. 
226 Id. paras. 3-9 (explaining changes in program away from self-certification towards 
independent testing); see McCallister, supra note 209, at 19. 
227 MCCALLISTER, supra note 184, at 49. 
228 Id. at 53. 
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The Administrative Conference of the United States has studied the use of 
third-party certification regimes and recommends that agencies carefully 
“evaluate whether sufficient incentives exist or can be created to attract the 
participation of regulated entities in the third-party program.”229 As examples of 
such incentives, it mentions an “exemption from a governmental fee” and the 
ability to satisfy multi-jurisdictional regulatory requirements “through a single 
third-party conformity assessment.”230 The Administrative Conference 
concluded, morever, that when an agency relies on third-party evaluators, it “has 
a duty to exercise oversight to ensure that the third-party is fulfilling its 
regulatory purpose.”231 Similarly, with respect to private regulatory initiatives, 
the ISEAL Alliance works with “multi-stakeholder sustainability standards and 
accreditation bodies that demonstrate their ability to meet the ISEAL Codes of 
Good Practice and accompanying requirements, and commit to learning and 
improving,” enabling efforts like the MSC to increase their effectiveness.232  
In general, private regulation efforts are unlikely to succeed without the 
backing of effective public oversight to address the threat of opportunist 
behavior by companies claiming compliance, but disregarding relevant 
requirements.233 This general rule, however, gives way to important 
 
229 ACUS Recommendation 2012-7, Agency Use of Third-Party Programs to Assess 
Regulatory Compliance, 78 Fed. Reg. 2941, 2942 (Jan. 15, 2013). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 2943. 
232 About Us, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/ 
9PQE-HPM8] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); see Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in 
Governance: A Functional Typology of Private Governance Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y F. 67, 95-96 (2011) (praising role of ISEAL Alliance). 
233 See Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Stock Market Self-
Regulation During the First Seventy Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 
BUS. LAW. 1347, 1347 (2004) (“[I]ndustry self-regulation subject to SEC supervision 
generally has been effective in its major applications when the Commission has been willing 
to threaten or actually use its regulatory authority to create incentives for securities industry 
self-regulation.”); Jodi L. Short, Self-Regulation in the Regulatory Void: “Blue Moon” or 
“Bad Moon,” 649 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 23 (2013) (finding that “self-
regulation works best when it is not really self-regulation at all, but when it constitutes 
regulated organizations as more governable institutions within a robust regulatory regime”). 
As one study of the chemical industry’s Responsible Care program found: 
Our research exposes the difficulty in establishing and maintaining industry self-
regulation. Responsible Care has operated up to now without explicit sanctions for 
malfeasance. As a result, our data suggest, it has fallen victim to enough opportunism 
that it includes a disproportionate number of poor performers, and its members do not 
improve faster than nonmembers. 
Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The 
Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698, 713 (2000). For an 
economic modeling of this concept, see Peter M. DeMarzo, Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen 
M. Hagerty, Self-Regulation and Government Oversight, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 687, 700 
(2005) (concluding that “[o]versight allows the government to threaten enforcement without 
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exceptions.234 First off, as in the MSC case, a purely private regulatory regime 
that is viewed as credible and develops a successful brand in the marketplace 
can influence industry behavior by using a meaningful certification regime.235 
Second, either a private or a public sector effort can be successful if industry 
participants believe that compliance is valuable and may well sway regulatory 
or legal authorities by operating as a safe harbor in practice (such as with BITAG 
and the Copyright Alliance).236 Finally, as in the FTC’s oversight of online 
privacy, the adoption of either a private regulatory standard or compliance with 
best practices developed by a governmental agency may take hold as ways to 
avoid more stringent governmental regulation.237 Indeed, some commentators 
have argued that some private certification efforts outperform government ones 
by effectively resisting public choice pressures—with the aid of empowered 
members (such as the role of insurance companies in UL who insist on 
vigilance)—that would undermine their reliability.238 
 
actually undertaking any” and that threat raises level of compliance by self-regulatory bodies). 
234 Elinor Ostrom has identified the core conditions necessary for such exceptions. See 
Elinor Ostrom, A Long Polycentric Journey, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 1, 6 (2010) (noting 
importance of level of trust, reliable data, effective decision-monitoring, and ability to adapt, 
and concluding that “individuals facing [collective action problems] do not always need an 
external authority” to solve them). 
235 See King & Lenox, supra note 233, at 713 (noting that “explicit sanctions administered 
by informed outsiders may be needed to avoid opportunism within an industry self-regulatory 
scheme” and suggesting that third-party certifiers and publicizing firm performance 
information can discipline industry behavior); Vandenbergh, supra note 64, at 166 (“Private 
certification and labeling systems directed at consumers are a form of large-scale private 
ordering that may be able to overcome . . . collective action problems . . . .”). There are cases 
where public regulation can serve to develop a self-enforcing norm—such as banning 
smoking—even where there is no formal enforcement of the rule. See Michael J. Licari, 
Bureaucratic Discretion and Regulatory Success Without Enforcement, in POLITICS, POLICY, 
AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY 276, 289 
(George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2005). This dynamic could conceivably take 
hold in certain private initiatives as well. See id. (finding that using signaled information, 
rather than coercion, may yield successful policies and noting that this “suggests that other, 
nonregulatory agencies can play an important role in implementation of regulation”). 
236 See supra notes 61, 69-76. 
237 Meidinger, supra note 83, at 59 (“[T]he threat of increased governmental regulation in 
the absence of effective non-governmental regulation has sometimes been a background 
factor in the acceptance of certification.”); Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Organizations, 
Regulation, and Economic Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and Forms from the Nineteenth 
to Twenty-First Century, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 31, 48 (2008) (explaining nuclear power 
industry’s creation of successful self-regulatory initiative); Vandenbergh, supra note 64, at 
137 (“Corporations have incentives to use private governance to mollify stakeholder concerns 
and to displace more stringent government regulation, and it would be surprising if some 
private efforts do not have these effects.”). 
238 Lytton, supra note 143, at 560-61. 
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D. Evaluating the Challenges of Experimentation and Policy 
Entrepreneurship 
As highlighted above and developed further in Part IV, a prerequisite to 
experimentation and departing from traditional models is overcoming 
bureaucratic inertia. As explained in this Section, it is possible that 
experimentation spurred by entrepreneurial leadership could make things 
worse—if applied to programs and processes that are working reasonably well. 
In this Section, I discuss five types of risks of departing from a traditional model: 
(1) taking policy in a lawless (or even dangerous) direction, (2) undermining a 
good (even if imperfect) program, (3) evading public input and transparency, 
(4) discouraging better practice by promoting best practice, and (5) enabling 
industry capture. 
A bureaucratic system is designed to ensure regularity and consistency in 
decisionmaking. Max Weber, who evaluated the emerging bureaucratic state in 
the early 1900s, identified this basic characteristic and described how it 
operated.239 As Professor Gillian Metzger explained, Weberian bureaucracy 
exists in today’s federal government as “major federal agencies are generally 
hierarchically organized and staffed substantially by career public servants with 
removal protection.”240 Consequently, once a program is designed and once 
processes are instituted, bureaucratic inertia serves the purpose of protecting the 
basics of the program. 
A basic objection to the idea that agencies can earn regulatory authority 
through entrepreneurial initiatives is that this model will undermine effective 
public administration. In the strongest version of this concern, entrepreneurial 
leaders in government and experimentation in regulatory programs provide 
flexibility to governmental leaders that is abused.241 Viewed against this 
concern, bureaucratic inertia and regular processes provide bulwarks against 
abuse and corruption.242 In the case of President Trump, for example, some have 
 
239 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 956-
59 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968). In line with 
Weber’s analysis, Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson explained that bureaucracy serves the 
purpose of “promot[ing] probity in mission, responsiveness, and [consistent] 
communication.” Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction 
Cost Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 325 (1999). 
240 Gillian B. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1848 
(2015). 
241 On this view, for example, J. Edgar Hoover’s entrepreneurial leadership takes the form 
of abusing his position. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE EXCELLENCE 1 (2015), 
https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/jbraithwaite/_documents/Articles/2015_Responsive-
Excellence.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z87-W5J3] (“J. Edgar Hoover is the archetypical evil 
regulator because he sought to be transformative by abusing arbitrary power.”). 
242 See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 515, 540-41 (2015) (explaining how civil servants “are well positioned to push back on 
any tendency agency leaders might have to skirt laws and promote hyperpartisan interests”). 
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suggested that bureaucratic inertia is a powerful force that will minimize the 
impact of dangerous policies.243 
The concern about making changes for the sake of change or making 
misguided changes is well taken. As a foundational principle, those evaluating 
changes to existing programs should remember that “the best is the enemy of the 
good.”244 For a regulatory program that works well enough, but could be 
improved, experimentation and innovation might make matters worse. 
Emphasizing this point, commentators like Professor Jill Lepore have reacted to 
Professor Clayton Christensen’s high praise for innovation with strong criticism; 
as Lepore puts it, the core weakness of Christensen’s praise of innovation is that 
“[t]ransfixed by change, it’s blind to continuity.”245 
Skeptics of innovation highlight the risk that governmental leaders will pursue 
change and innovation for its own sake, fail to know what they do not know, and 
undermine well-functioning programs in the process.246 Such concerns are 
particularly poignant where the risks of failure—which can arise when departing 
from traditional processes, such as those involved in ensuring nuclear safety 
regulation—are greatest. In such contexts, my critique of government’s 
undervaluing the impact of false negatives on account of the inertial bias against 
experimentation and innovation does not apply with the same force.247 Indeed, 
some regulatory reforms later connected to the financial crisis were criticized on 
this very ground,248 in line with the conventional defense of bureaucratic inertia 
“as a brake on ill-considered adaptations.”249 
 
243 See, e.g, Leon Neyfakh, Can the “Secret Government” Save Us?, SLATE (Nov. 14, 
2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/11/can_the_secret_go 
vernment_save_us_from_donald_trump.html [https://perma.cc/Z8YQ-UU9K]. 
244 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 716 (Angela Partington ed., rev. 4th ed. 
1996) (translating “[l]e mieux est l’ennemi du bien” to mean “[t]he best is the enemy of the 
good”). 
245 Jill Lepore, The Disruption Machine, NEW YORKER, June 23, 2014, at 30, 36. But see 
Drake Bennett, Clayton Christensen Responds to New Yorker Takedown of ‘Disruptive 
Innovation,’ BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 21, 2014, 1:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2014-06-20/clayton-christensen-responds-to-new-yorker-takedown-of-disrupt 
ive-innovation (interviewing Clayton Christensen and discussing Jillian Lepore’s critique of 
Christensen’s work). 
246 This concern, about elected or appointed officials vis-à-vis the professional 
bureaucracy, goes back to Weber. See Thomas H. Hammond, Veto Points, Policy Preferences, 
and Bureaucracy in Democratic Systems, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: 
FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY, supra note 235, at 73, 74 (noting 
advantages of bureaucracy over political leaders). 
247 See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1029 (2014) 
(stating that “high reliability theory forbids trial-and-error learning because it is simply too 
risky that errors will arise”). 
248 See Weiser, supra note 35, at 573 (discussing SEC decision to change capital 
requirements for investment banks). 
249 Klein, supra note 111, at 9. 
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As explained above, we are moving into an age where networks, more than 
hierarchies, can better coordinate and influence behavior and adapt to changing 
circumstances.250 As such, it is important to take neither a “blind obedience to 
disruption [nor] blind obedience to continuity.”251 Skeptics of innovation may 
be inclined to defend status-quo approaches and doubt calls for experimentation, 
but as discussed above with respect to the development of the healthcare.gov 
website,252 the use of traditional approaches in the midst of changing 
circumstances can have disastrous results.  
Second, some criticize experimental regulatory strategies as operating outside 
of traditional administrative law norms. Professor Jody Freeman highlighted this 
concern, recommending that “standard-setting groups should adhere to at least 
some internal procedural rules designed to promote information disclosure, 
reasoned decision making, and fairness.”253 Building on this suggestion, 
Freeman argues that “privatization can be a means of ‘publicization,’ through 
which private actors increasingly commit themselves to traditionally public 
goals.”254 When following the recommendations above, this vision can be 
realized. Where, however, private regulatory models (or agencies developing 
best practices outside of rulemaking or adjudication) fail to do so, Freeman’s 
cautionary concern is well taken. 
Third, the promotion of best practices, where an agency decides to do so, 
raises notable risks. Most significantly, government-promoted best practices can 
lead to a “ritual of comfort,” where companies become complacent by following 
guidelines that are not updated appropriately.255 As Professor Michael Power 
describes, such rituals exist when companies follow outdated or useless 
procedures to give the appearance of accountability or order without advancing 
any useful purpose.256 In the cybersecurity context, the risk of a check-the-box 
compliance mentality is substantial, as “enhancing the cybersecurity posture of 
a system—and by extension the organization in which it is embedded—must be 
understood as an ongoing process rather than something that can be done once 
 
250 See JOHN HAGEL III & JOHN SEELY BROWN, INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION: CREATING 
SMARTER ORGANIZATIONS TO SCALE LEARNING 2 (2013), http://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-
en/topics/innovation/institutional-innovation.html [https://perma.cc/W3JG-R5P3] (download 
report from side-menu) (calling for “‘scalable learning’ with the goal of creating smarter 
institutions that can thrive in a world of exponential change”). 
251 Greg Satell, Let’s Stop Arguing About Whether Disruption Is Good or Bad, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (May 21, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/lets-stop-arguing-about-whether-disruption-is-
good-or-bad [https://perma.cc/YY8V-AXT6]. 
252 See supra notes 93-110 and accompanying text. 
253 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 643 
(2000). 
254 Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1285, 1285 (2003). 
255 See MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION 96 (1997). 
256 Id. 
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and then forgotten.”257 Citing such concerns, some commentators are critical of 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (“NIST”) Cybersecurity 
Framework.258 Viewed more generally, this concern is why government-
convened efforts should not settle for a traditional “best practices” model; rather, 
they should insist on building a framework and capability to drive continuously 
developing “better practice.” 
Finally, experimental regulatory programs could enable the evasion of stricter 
requirements and provide an ineffective form of oversight. The success of the 
LEED standard and the MSC certification model over industry opposition 
suggests otherwise, underscoring that “public choice” concerns do not always 
lurk behind such models.259 Nonetheless, there is a risk that such initiatives could 
provide the appearance, but not the reality, of regulatory oversight. The critical 
question, however, is whether the public choice risks in experimental contexts 
are necessarily greater than those in traditional programs. If experimental 
programs are designed to engage a wide range of stakeholders, they may well be 
less susceptible to such risks. 
III. CASE STUDIES OF EXPERIMENTAL REGULATION AND EARNED 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
Governmental oversight of emerging technologies can take different forms. 
One theme that runs through each of the case studies discussed in this Part is that 
there are potentially significant benefits from building cooperation, facilitating 
coordination, and elevating the level of trust in an entire sector that comes from 
a shared commitment to a defined level of responsible behavior.260 Catalyzing 
those benefits, however, requires entrepreneurial leadership and appropriate 
incentives to overcome the collective action problem. In the first three case 
 
257 COMM. ON DEVELOPING A CYBERSECURITY PRIMER ET AL., AT THE NEXUS OF 
CYBERSECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICY: SOME BASIC CONCEPTS AND ISSUES 2-3 (David Clark, 
Thomas Berson & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2014). 
258 See, e.g., Robert Gyenes, A Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework Is Unworkable—
Government Must Crack the Whip, 14 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 293, 307-10 (2014) (stating that 
the Framework fails to establish (1) sufficiently clear compliance obligations, (2) adequate 
incentives for systems improvement, (3) novel practices that market could not otherwise 
achieve on its own, and (4) appropriate cost analysis). 
259 See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 89, at 568 (providing example of public choice 
behavior as when “[p]rivate interest groups lobby for regulatory policies that advance the 
material well-being of their members—at best without regard to whether these policies serve 
the larger public interest, and often with the precise object of profiting at the expense of the 
public or some competing group”). 
260 See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory 
State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 580-81 (2010) (commenting that “[m]uch of the vaunted ‘New 
Economy’ turns out to be a coordination economy” and calling for examination of how 
regulatory agencies can facilitate coordination). 
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studies, entrepreneurial leaders successfully developed such efforts; in the fourth 
study, HHS has, thus far, largely failed to do so. 
A. The LEED Building Standard 
For a case study of private regulation influencing industry behavior, consider 
the impact of the LEED building standards.261 To appreciate its impact (and in a 
“perverse sign of its expanding influence”), some industry groups are concerned 
about its demanding requirements and are resorting to the political process to 
ban any reference to the standard, with Mississippi having already enacted such 
a law.262 Despite such efforts, the LEED standard is now the leading one for 
green buildings and has helped grow that sector to forty-five percent of new 
institutional construction.263 
The now-familiar LEED certification is administered by the USGBC and 
allows builders to certify compliance at different levels of stringency (Platinum, 
Gold, Silver, and Bronze), with 2.2 million square feet certified daily.264 LEED’s 
significance is such that, as one commentator put it, “[i]ndustry groups now 
lobby the USGBC regarding the content of LEED standards in ways that might 
have been directed at Congress or the [EPA] two decades ago.”265 Initially, the 
Council’s only mandate was its moral authority to encourage better practice. 
Today, there are both sticks (a number of municipalities have adopted rules for 
 
261 See generally LEED, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, https://new.usgbc.org/leed 
[https://perma.cc/XGP5-KXGH] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
262 Emily Badger, Why Are Some States Trying to Ban LEED Green Building Standards?, 
CITY LAB (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.citylab.com/design/2013/08/why-are-some-states-
trying-ban-leed-green-building-standards/6691 [https://perma.cc/7AB9-F436]. The efforts to 
ban LEED, pushed by some industry groups, stem from the concern that the USGBC has shut 
“out many stakeholders, [is] unbalanced in its committee representation and lack[s] 
transparency.” Craig Silvertooth, Commentary: More Voices Need to Be Heard When Setting 
Green Standards, WASH. POST (July 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
capitalbusiness/commentary-more-voices-need-to-be-heard-when-setting-green-standards/ 
2013/07/19/4fd8200a-ed63-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html [https://perma.cc/7R8J-
HP3Z]. Supporters of the LEED standard counter that the real issue is the timber industry’s 
opposition to stricter standards of conduct, notably, the FSC. See supra notes 191-200 and 
accompanying text; see also Badger, supra (claiming that FSC “demands costlier and more 
sustainable practices” in order to “pass off fundamentally status quo, barely legal forestry 
practices as green and sustainable”). 
263 See The Business Case for Green Building, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL (Feb. 10, 
2015), https://www.usgbc.org/articles/business-case-green-building [https://perma.cc/DX4L-
VTNP]. For a favorable assessment of the LEED standard, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
CERTIFIABLY SUSTAINABLE? THE ROLE OF THIRD-PARTY CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS 47-65 
(2010). 
264 LEED, supra note 261. 
265 Vandenbergh, supra note 64, at 154. 
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requiring LEED certification)266 and carrots (a number of state governments, as 
well as the federal government, have adopted incentive programs in this area)267 
to encourage compliance. 
The LEED standard provides an overall structure for evaluating energy and 
environmental impact. It is structured around a 110-point scale, across eight 
credit categories: Energy and Atmosphere, Indoor Environmental Quality, 
Innovation in Design, Location and Transportation, Materials and Resources, 
Regional Priority, Sustainable Sites, and Water Efficiency.268 The USGBC 
continues to refine this system through regular notice-and-comment 
opportunities, thereby ensuring that new technologies are captured and 
encouraged.269 With respect to oversight, the Council has delegated the 
certification process to the Green Building Council Institute (“GBCI”), which 
accredits green building professionals.270 Those professionals can work with 
builders to submit an application for LEED certification.271 For applications that 
do not meet the minimum program requirements, the GBCI rejects the 
application. If the GBCI later learns of any inaccurate information that supported 
 
266 See Michael T. Durham, Counsel’s Role in Sustainable Solutions: Pay Now or Pay 
Later, 31 STRATEGIC PLAN. FOR ENERGY & ENV’T 19, 31 (2012). 
267 Rob Freeman, 5 Green Building Tax Incentives for 2016, POPLAR NETWORK (Jan. 26, 
2016), https://www.poplarnetwork.com/news/5-green-building-tax-incentives-2015 [https:// 
perma.cc/QJY2-RB9K] (“Financial incentives include long term, low interest rate energy 
efficiency financing and grants tied to renewable energy investment.”). 
268 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND MAJOR 
RENOVATIONS (V4) 1, https://www.usgbc.org/credits/new-construction/v4/indoor-environme 
ntal-quality [https://perma.cc/BH69-7CUR] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (score card can be 
downloaded from side menu). 
269 Mary Jane Angelo & Joanna Reilly-Brown, Whole-System Agricultural Certification: 
Using Lessons Learned from LEED to Build a Resilient Agricultural System to Adapt to 
Climate Change, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 689, 745 (2014) (“Strengths of the LEED program 
include its flexible credit system, the transparent nature of the standards-setting process, and 
the program’s whole-building life-cycle approach to certification.”); About LEED, U.S. 
GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/articles/about-leed [https://perma.cc/MPS3-
5SU8] (last updated Oct. 2017) (“LEED credits . . . are developed through several rounds of 
public comments and in collaboration with the [USGBC’s] board, broader membership and 
staff.”). 
270 New Credentialing Organization Launched for Green Building Professionals, 
BUILDINGS (Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.buildings.com/news/industry-news/articleid/5451/tit 
le/new-credentialing-organization-launched-for-green-building-professionals.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/U78E-CA5X]. 
271 See What Is the Green Business Certification Inc. (GBCI), U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, 
https://www.usgbc.org/help/what-green-building-certification-institute-gbci [https://perma. 
cc/4275-WAWH] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
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a successful application, it can revoke the certification, subject to the GBCI 
Challenge Policy.272 
B. The FTC’s Approach on Privacy and Data Security 
The FTC has established itself as the de facto privacy enforcer in the United 
States. In other countries, national data protection authorities are formally 
empowered by enabling legislation.273 In the United States, however, the FTC 
has used its legacy and broad Section 5 authority, designed to address “unfair or 
deceptive” trade practices,274 to oversee privacy issues. More recently, the FTC 
broadened its use of that authority to oversee data security matters.275 This 
authority enables the FTC to address matters where the act or practice at issue 
“causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”276 For cases of 
deception, the relevant harm can be presumed; for cases of “unfair practices,” 
the burden is on the FTC to identify the harmful impact of the relevant 
conduct.277 
Modern privacy law and policy in the United States emerged from an act of 
policy entrepreneurship by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 
 
272 See generally GREEN BUS. CERTIFICATION, INC., GBCI Certification Challenge Policy, 
https://www.usgbc.org/sites/default/files/GBCI-Cert-Challenge-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8FMP-Z2LF]. It appears that very few, if any, LEED certifications are later revoked under 
this policy. See, e.g., Stuart Kaplow, Revocation of LEED Certification, GREEN BUILDING L. 
UPDATE (June 2, 2014), http://www.greenbuildinglawupdate.com/2014/06/articles/leed/ 
revocation-of-leed-certification [https://perma.cc/HXC6-Q523] (“We know with certainty 
that GBCI has never revoked a certification, but GBCI does not make public complaints that 
initiate the Challenge Policy. It is apparent challenges are infrequent.”). 
273 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THIRTY YEARS AFTER: THE OECD 
PRIVACY GUIDELINES 26 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/49710223.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/FRD6-GYLX] (“Nearly all OECD countries have established authorities for 
enforcing data protection laws.”). 
274 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). Originally, the FTC Act only addressed “unfair 
competition.” See Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, sec. 3, § 5, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45). In 1938, in the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, Congress expanded 
the Commission’s authority to enable it to address “unfair or deceptive acts of practices in 
commerce.” Id. 
275 See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2015). 
276 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
277 J. Howard Beales, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and 
Resurrection, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 30, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/public-state 
ments/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-its-rise-fall-and-resurrection [https://perma.cc/ 
3FHD-SQZK] (stating that Commission must analyze each case by balancing costs and 
benefits of challenged behavior, which “allows the Commission to provide strong consumer 
protection against marketplace abuses without prohibiting related conduct that is beneficial to 
consumers”). 
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1973. A Department report introduced the concept of Fair Information Practice 
Principles (“FIPPs”).278 These principles not only shaped the U.S. Privacy Act, 
but also became influential around the world, providing the framework for the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development’s (“OECD”) 1980 
Privacy Guidelines.279 The first and fundamental principle of FIPPs is that 
individuals have the right to know what data is gathered about them and how 
that data will be used.280 The second principle is that individuals have the right 
to consent—or withhold their consent—as to how that data can be used.281 Taken 
together, these two principles represent the concept of “notice and choice,” 
which the FTC has used as the foundation of modern information privacy policy. 
When the FTC took up the challenge of developing a U.S. regime on privacy 
protection in the online environment, the concept of “notice and choice” was 
followed only in the breach. Notably, in 1998, only two percent of all websites 
had privacy policies.282 To spur the industry into action, the FTC encouraged 
online companies to post privacy policies that specified what data was collected, 
how it was used, and how customers could protect their data (at a minimum, by 
choosing whether to use the service).283 Within two years, the number of 
websites with posted privacy policies rose from fourteen percent to eighty-eight 
percent.284 To be sure, the mere fact that websites adopted policies does not 
mean that they were protective or they were necessarily adhered to; but the mere 
publication of policies can create liability under the FTC’s Section 5 authority if 
companies fail to live up to their promises. 
 
278 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF 
CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL 
DATA SYSTEMS 41-42 (1973), https://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/M6C2-QQAJ]. 
279 See generally Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Recommendation of the Council 
Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, C(80)58/FINAL (Sept. 23, 1980), http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ 
ShowInstrumentView.aspx?%20InstrumentID=114&InstrumentPID=312 [https://perma.cc/ 
L2XL-7DGS]; Bartosz M. Marcinkowski, Privacy Paradox(es): In Search of a Transatlantic 
Data Protection Standard, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1167, 1175-83 (2013) (discussing impact of HEW 
report and OECD guidelines). 
280 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 278, at 41 (“There must be a 
way for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and how it is 
used.”). 
281 Id. 
282 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS iii (1998), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/pri 
v-23a.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V8H-A3GQ]. 
283 Id. at ii-iii. 
284 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
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The success of the FTC’s online privacy initiative reflected, among other 
factors, the entrepreneurial leadership of its Chairman, Bob Pitofsky.285 Under 
Pitofsky, the agency engaged in a sustained campaign to encourage the online 
industry to adopt privacy policies, provide guidance on best practice, measure 
compliance, encourage advertisers not to work with companies without privacy 
policies, and emphasize that legislative action loomed if the industry failed to 
act on its own.286 As noted above, once firms put privacy policies in place, the 
FTC could enforce them under its Section 5 authority because breaching 
promises to consumers constitutes an “unfair or deceptive” act.287 
In light of the FTC’s emerging leadership in the field, its authority was 
enhanced by three statutory developments in the late 1990s. First, Congress 
passed a special law—designed around the notice and choice architecture—to 
protect children online, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(“COPPA”), and give the FTC rulemaking authority under that law.288 Second, 
Congress passed a law governing financial privacy, the Graham-Leach-Bliley 
Act (also built around notice and choice and a data security standard), thereby 
granting the FTC, among other agencies, enforcement authority under the law.289 
Finally, the Department of Commerce negotiated a role for the FTC to enforce 
compliance with the European Union Data Protection Initiative’s safe harbor 
 
285 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Statement of the 
Federal Trade Commission on “Self-Regulation and Privacy Online” 4 (July 13, 1999), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-
federal-trade-commission-self-regulation-and-privacy-online/privacyonlinetestimony.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UX2P-HYDZ] (describing self-regulation as “least intrusive and most 
efficient means to ensure fair information practices online”). 
286 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 12-14 (1999), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/self-regulat 
ion-privacy-onlinea-federal-trade-commission-report-congress/1999self-regulationreport. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/V8SE-7AHQ] (“[T]he Commission believes that legislation to address 
online privacy is not appropriate at this time.”); Hetcher, supra note 52, at 2047. 
287 See Kovacic, supra note 44, at 25 (defining “essential” as “availability of the broad, 
flexible policy mandate of Section 5”). The FTC has pursued a similar course with respect to 
green marketing claims. See Jason J. Czarnezki, Greenwashing and Self-Declared Seafood 
Ecolabels, 28 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 42-48 (2014) (“The FTC published the Green Guides ‘to 
enlighten marketers and explain how [the] FTC will enforce section five of [the] FTCA in the 
environmental marketing and advertising context.’” (alterations in original)). 
288 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2012)). 
289 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-02, § 503, 113 Stat. 1338, 1439 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6804(a)(1)(C)) (“[T]he [FTC] shall . . . prescribe . . . such 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this subtitle with respect to the 
financial institutions subject to [its] jurisdiction under section 505.”). 
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regime.290 In short, over a period of about five years, the FTC “leveraged its very 
limited powers and fragmented authority to hoist itself into the position of being 
the dominant regulatory force for data privacy,”291 with Congress responding to 
its effectiveness by providing it with additional authorities. 
From 2000 to 2010, the FTC’s “privacy jurisprudence [became] the broadest 
and most influential regulating force on information privacy in the United 
States—more so than nearly any privacy statute or common law tort.”292 As 
Professors Daniel Solove and Woody Hartzog capture in their study on the topic, 
FTC enforcement activity in this area, which is relatively robust, has developed 
a series of principles that are carefully followed and implemented by companies 
who collect information from consumers.293 To supplement this enforcement 
record (and set of principles), the FTC has used its “soft law” capability of 
developing best practices through convenings and reports, with practitioners 
paying close attention to them as well.294 Finally, the FTC has sought to 
supplement its efforts by encouraging complementary self-regulation.295 
The FTC’s development of data security standards reflects an even more 
ambitious and imaginative use of its authority. Breaking promises with respect 
to a firm’s privacy policies constitutes a fairly straightforward deceptive act. By 
contrast, when it came to data security matters, the FTC relied on the theory that 
a failure to follow reasonable data security practices—say, for example, using 
 
290 MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.-EU Data 
Privacy: From Safe Harbor to Privacy Shield 5-6 (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/misc/R44257.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5QV-ANSV]. 
291 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 605 (2014). Solove and Hartzog praise this effort. Id. at 676. By 
contrast, Gus Hurwitz critiques it. See generally Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the 
FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955 (2016). 
292 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 291, at 587. 
293 Id. at 614-22 (noting substantive principles developed by FTC over time and explaining 
how lawyers pay careful attention to them to advise their clients); see Kenneth A. Bamberger 
& Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 273-
75 (2011) (examining role of Chief Privacy Officers in evaluating “state-of-the-art privacy 
practices,” including FTC actions and guidance, to develop company policies and 
procedures). 
294 Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 293, at 313 (explaining how FTC used “soft-law 
techniques” to develop its substantive principles); Solove and Hartzog, supra note 291, at 
625-27 (analogizing FTC’s soft law to dicta in judicial opinions). 
295 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Success in Self-Regulation: 
Strategies to Bring to the Mobile and Global Era 10 (June 24, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/documents/public_statements/410391/140624bbbself-regulation.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/VH6T-3LLB] (“Over the last decade, the FTC has encouraged the development of 
a strong self-regulatory framework in the realm of online behavioral advertising so that 
consumers’ potentially sensitive personal information is protected.”). 
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insecure open wireless networks (without password protection)—constituted an 
“unfair act or practice.”296 
In the sole judicial opinion on this topic, the Third Circuit upheld the FTC’s 
theory on the grounds that a company’s privacy policy that leads a consumer to 
believe her data will be safeguarded is misleading and unfair when that company 
fails to adhere to reasonable practices to protect her data.297 In particular, the 
court analogized the series of data security failings that led to earlier FTC 
enforcement actions and the hacking of information from 619,000 consumers 
and $10.6 million in fraud to a “supermarket[] leaving so many banana peels all 
over the place that 619,000 customers fall.”298 In so doing, the court arguably 
ratified the FTC’s effort to place companies on notice that a failure to follow 
principles highlighted by past enforcement actions can give rise to liability.299 
C. NIST and Cybersecurity 
The Obama Administration’s approach to cybersecurity regulation followed 
from its commitment to a multi-stakeholder model of internet regulation. 
Originally, the Obama Administration proposed legislation to address 
cybersecurity issues, even suggesting model legislative language.300 After 
Congress declined to act, President Obama issued Executive Order 13636, 
“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” on February 12, 2013, which 
established that “[i]t is the Policy of the United States to enhance the security 
and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and to maintain a cyber 
environment that encourages efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity 
while promoting safety, security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil 
liberties.”301 In particular, the Executive Order called on NIST for the 
development of a voluntary risk-based Cybersecurity Framework, working 
“collaboratively with industry to develop the framework, relying on existing 
 
296 In re BJ Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 468 (2005). 
297 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2015). 
298 Id. at 247. 
299 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 291, at 651-56. This point is arguable because the 
court’s opinion can be read more narrowly, see Hurwitz, supra note 291, at 975, and because 
ongoing litigation challenges the FTC’s approach in this area. See J. Howard Beales, III & 
Timothy J. Muris, Choice of Consequences: Protecting Privacy in Commercial Information, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 132 (2008) (terming use of unfairness authority in data security cases 
“appropriate,” but noting that it is “potentially far-reaching and subject to abuse”); id. (“An 
unfairness theory is sound when security deficiencies are clear, have resulted in intentional 
breaches that are highly likely to lead to fraudulent use of the information, and low-cost steps 
that would significantly reduce the risk are readily apparent.”). 
300 FACT SHEET: Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal, WHITE HOUSE (May 12, 2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/12/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-legislativ 
e-proposal [https://perma.cc/V3SF-SHHU]. 
301 Exec. Order No. 13,636, 3 C.F.R. 217 (2014). 
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international standards, practices, and procedures that have proven to be 
effective.”302 
In 2014, NIST introduced its “Framework for Improving Cybersecurity 
Infrastructure.”303 The goal of the framework is to use “business drivers to guide 
cybersecurity activities and considering cybersecurity risks as part of the 
organization’s risk management processes.”304 The framework focuses on five 
core functional categories—identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover—with 
guidance in each area on how to manage cybersecurity risk.305 In establishing 
the framework, NIST made clear that this framework is not a checklist, but an 
evolving set of best practices.306 It has emphasized that the framework is not 
“one-size-fits-all,” meaning that it must be adapted by each organization using 
it and be utilized with constant vigilance.307 As in the case of the Energy Star 
program, Congress—having observed the NIST Framework in practice—later 
embraced the model, codifying NIST’s approach in the Cybersecurity 
Enhancement Act of 2014 and calling on the GAO to regularly review the 
effectiveness of the framework.308 
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework won praise both for its process and its 
substance. In terms of process, the 2015 GAO report celebrated NIST’s 
effectiveness, noting that an overwhelming share of respondents (170 out of 187) 
praised NIST’s engagement with industry in developing the framework.309 On 
 
302 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Executive Order on Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Feb. 12, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
realitycheck/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-
cybersecurity-0 [https://perma.cc/48D9-PYZN]; see Doty & Mulligan, supra note 198, at 155 
(describing process as “seek[ing] to facilitate collaborative processes that support and raise 
the influence of the relevant parties, foster experimentation, and promote accountability to 
substantive aims”). 
303 See generally NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY (2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/doc 
uments/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf [https://perma.cc/NE56-ZKA 
B]. 
304 Id. at 1. 
305 Id. at 7-9. 
306 See id. at 4 (“[T]he Framework outcomes will scale across borders, acknowledge the 
global nature of cybersecurity risks, and evolve with technological advances and business 
requirements.”). 
307 Id. at 2 (“The Framework is a living document and will continue to be updated and 
improved as industry provides feedback on implementation.”); see COMM. ON DEVELOPING A 
CYBERSECURITY PRIMER ET AL., supra note 257, at 2 (“[C]ybersecurity is a never-ending 
battle, and a permanently decisive solution to the problem will not be found in the foreseeable 
future.”). 
308 Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 7421 et seq.). 
309 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-152, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION: MEASURES NEEDED TO ASSESS AGENCIES’ PROMOTION OF THE CYBERSECURITY 
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substance, the framework is gaining followers, with the Gartner Group, for 
example, predicting that “[b]y 2020, more than 50% of organizations will use 
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, up from the current 30% in 2015.”310 As 
for the incentives for adopting the framework, businesses reported a number of 
motivations (including business partner requirements (twenty-nine percent) and 
federal contract requirements (twenty-eight percent)), but principally cited the 
goal of adhering to cybersecurity best practices (seventy percent).311 
Commentators also noted that adopting the framework can reduce legal risk, 
whether from consumer lawsuits or government enforcement actions.312 By 
contrast, other agencies with congressionally provided authority in this area—
HHS, as discussed below313—have struggled to catalyze compliance with 
cybersecurity best practices, even when they have more formal authority to do 
so.314 
In what should drive adoption, the FTC embraced the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework as a valuable guide to sound data security practices. As to its 
oversight of specific statutory areas like the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (in 
financial services) and the COPPA, as well as in policing “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices,” the FTC has stated that it will take account of whether firms 
adopted the framework in determining whether they have acted reasonably.315 
In making this point clear, the FTC underscored that the NIST Framework 
focuses on process, and that neither the Framework nor the FTC provide any 
 
FRAMEWORK 15 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674300.pdf [https://perma.cc/T94U-
MP4M]. By contrast, around half (59 out of 112) of those surveyed concluded that the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) was serving an effective role in providing 
cybersecurity assistance. Id. at 19-20. The GAO also criticized DHS for its failure to establish 
metrics or monitoring programs related to the Framework. Id. at 22. 
310 Ted Gary, Tenable Automates NIST Cybersecurity Framework Technical Controls, 
TENABLE (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.tenable.com/blog/tenable-automates-nist-cybersecur 
ity-framework-technical-controls [https://perma.cc/B2FA-UAWZ]. 
311 Mark Francis, The Future of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY 
PROFS. (Apr. 25, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-future-of-the-nist-cybersecurity-
framework/ [https://perma.cc/ZV3M-X42L]. 
312 Id. 
313 See infra notes 321-49 and accompanying text. 
314 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-771, ELECTRONIC HEALTH 
INFORMATION: HHS NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY AND PRIVACY GUIDANCE AND 
OVERSIGHT 29 (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679260.pdf [https://perma.cc/PXL7-
3LG3]. 
315 Andrea Arias, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Aug. 31, 2016), www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/08/nist-cybersecurity-
framework-ftc [https://perma.cc/GMN3-EDQR] (“Applying the risk management approach 
presented in the Framework with a reasonable level of rigor—as companies should do—and 
applying the FTC’s Start with Security guidance will raise the cybersecurity bar of the nation 
as a whole and lead to more robust protection of consumers’ data.”). 
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hard-and-fast rules; thus, emphasizing that reasonable and responsible data 
security practices require constant vigilance.316 
Finally, NIST has left open the question of whether it should continue to 
superintend the Framework or partner with a multi-stakeholder body to manage 
that Framework. In a recent request for information, NIST asked a series of 
questions, including how to best manage this initiative.317 For now, NIST 
believes it is too early to make any changes, but it is clearly thinking about this 
possibility.318 As captured from the request for information responses, it is clear 
that if NIST were to make this change, “the desired characteristics of any 
potential successor” should be “a neutral non-profit organization with 
international reach, respected for technical proficiency, and willing to keep the 
Framework free, with participation open to all interested parties.”319 Such a 
model of the government’s incubating a successful initiative and spinning it off 
is not unprecedented. The FCC, for example, once managed its own equipment 
certification program, but now relies on the private sector to do so.320 
D. HHS, Electronic Health Records, and Data Security 
The discussion of how the FTC and NIST successfully developed regulatory 
initiatives to catalyze better cybersecurity practices provides a useful contrast to 
the efforts of HHS to do so. As noted above, the GAO specifically faulted HHS 
for its performance in this area.321 Under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)322 and the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH Act”),323 HHS enjoys more 
formal regulatory authority than either the FTC or NIST do to ensure data 
security and to provide customers access to that data. In particular, the goal of 
 
316 Id. (“[T]he FTC [recognizes] that there is no such thing as perfect security, and that 
security is a continuing process of detecting risks and adjusting one’s security program and 
defenses. For that reason, the touchstone of the FTC’s approach to data security has been 
reasonableness . . . .”). 
317 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., ANALYSIS OF CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK RFI 
RESPONSES 8, 11 (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
cyberframework/RFI3_Response_Analysis_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T4Z-J33S]. 
318 See id. at 2. 
319 Francis, supra note 311. 
320 Warren G. Lavey, Telecom Globalization and Deregulation Encounter U.S. National 
Security and Labor Concerns, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 121, 143-46 (2007). 
321 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 314, at 29. 
322 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2012) (“The Secretary shall establish rules to prevent an entity’s 
failure to provide information . . . with respect to previous coverage of an individual from 
adversely affecting any subsequent coverage of the individual under another group health plan 
or health insurance coverage.”). 
323 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a)(1) (2012). Notably, under the HITECH Act, HHS was 
authorized to assess penalties based on HIPAA violations due to “willful neglect.” Id. 
§ 1320d-5(a)(1)(C). 
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the HITECH Act is to drive the use of electronic health records (“EHRs”), 
prevent duplicative health care (estimated to cost between $148 billion and $226 
billion per year), and facilitate patients’ access to their own health care 
information.324 As both the HITECH Act and HIPAA recognize, however, 
putting health care information in electronic form raises significant 
cybersecurity risks.325 
Under HIPAA and the HITECH Act, HHS is authorized to drive better 
cybersecurity practices in health care records.326 To date, however, HHS has 
failed to do so, with unfortunate consequences. “[M]ore than half the U.S. 
population—168.3 million individuals— . . . have had their medical records 
breached,”327 reflecting the great value of health data on the black market.328 
According to the GAO, HHS is partially responsible for this state of affairs by 
failing to provide adequate guidance and failing to enforce HIPAA 
effectively.329 As the GAO explained, the HHS’s Security Rule is not clearly 
defined, has failed to incorporate relevant NIST guidance, and is poorly 
enforced.330 Consequently, the requirements for cybersecurity preparedness in 
healthcare are behind other sectors (e.g., financial services).331 
In its report, the GAO concluded that HHS has failed to develop a fully 
operational and effective auditing program, has not “follow[ed] up to ensure that 
agreed-upon corrective actions were taken once investigative cases were 
closed,” and has not established benchmarks to assess the effectiveness of its 
program, “result[ing] in less assurance that loss or misuse of health information 
is being adequately addressed.”332 The GAO identified one case, for example, 
where HHS received a complaint of a covered entity using easily guessed 
 
324 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 314, at 5, 7-9. 
325 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 222, at 1. 
326 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 314, at 1. 
327 Joseph Conn, GAO Slams HHS in Health IT Cybersecurity Report, MOD. HEALTHCARE 
(Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160926/NEWS/160929925 
[https://perma.cc/X9XN-KU7J]. 
328 Caroline Humer & Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record Is Worth More to Hackers than 
Your Credit Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
cybersecurity-hospitals-idUSKCN0HJ21I20140924 [https://perma.cc/8D7R-Y3C8] (“Stolen 
health credentials can go for $10 each, about 10 or 20 times the value of a U.S. credit card 
number . . . .”). 
329 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 314, at GAO Highlights (“Without 
more comprehensive guidance, covered entities may not be adequately protecting electronic 
health information from compromise. HHS has established an oversight program for 
compliance with privacy and security regulations, but actions did not always fully verify that 
the regulations were implemented.”). 
330 Id. at 5, 16, 19, 27. 
331 Bambauer, supra note 247, at 1050 (“The financial sector is more secure than other 
industries and operates under specific cybersecurity mandates embedded in law. This 
correlation is no coincidence.”). 
332 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 314, at GAO Highlights. 
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passwords to access health information and responded by sending the offending 
company a guidance document. In several other cases, HHS responded to health 
information being available on a website by sending a document discussing 
appropriate password protections for workstations.333 To fill in the gap of HHS’s 
oversight, the FTC has acted in this area, bringing a case against LabMD for 
failing to adhere to basic data security practices, sharing sensitive patient 
information, and failing to disclose the breach to its patients once it was 
discovered.334 LabMD is now appealing the FTC’s action, including on the 
ground that health care providers’ data security practices are subject to HHS 
oversight.335 
HHS is also required (under the HITECH Act) to enable individuals to gain 
access to their health care records in electronic form. Here, too, HHS’s efforts 
are open to criticism. HHS finally developed such a rule in 2015,336 after the 
White House called for “empower[ing] individuals and families to invest in and 
manage their health” by giving them access “to the applications and services that 
can safely and accurately analyze” their health information.337 The 
implementation of this effort is slow going, and, ironically, “some providers may 
be unwilling to share this information due to liability concerns with sharing 
HIPAA-protected information.”338 Indeed, in some cases, providers actively 
block access to this information—despite the statutory requirement to share 
 
333 Id. at 24. 
334 See generally Opinion of the Commission, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215 
(F.T.C. July 28, 2016), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160729labmd-opinion. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/5A2G-B7Y7]; Final Order, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215 
(F.T.C. July 28, 2016), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160729labmdorder.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S87K-9CF3]. 
335 Respondent LabMD, Inc.’s Application for Stay of Final Order Pending Review By a 
United States Court of Appeals at 11, LabMD, Inc, No. 9357, 2016 WL 4923403, at *11 
(F.T.C. Aug. 30, 2016), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160830labmdstayapplic 
ation.pdf. 
336 See generally Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive 
Program—Stage 3 and Modifications to Meaningful Use in 2015 through 2017; Final Rule, 
80 Fed. Reg. 62,762 (Oct. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 495). 
337 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: President Obama’s 
Precision Medicine Initiative (Jan. 30, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2015/01/30/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-precision-medicine-initiative [https:// 
perma.cc/QL2L-3QD8]. 
338 CHRIS LAUGHLIN, POLICY SOLUTIONS TO FULFILL THE PROMISE OF THE HEALTH 
INFORMATION TRANSFORMATION 6 (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2731863 [https://perma.cc/F8VP-B5CX] (paper may be downloaded by selecting 
download button at top of screen). 
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access.339 In other cases, even when they do share this information, they do so 
in a cost-prohibitive manner.340 
Not only has HHS failed to exercise its core mandates on security and access 
effectively, it has also failed to take action in a complementary area, that of 
personal health records (“PHRs”). Under HIPAA, HHS oversees electronic 
health records (“EHRs”) managed by health care providers.341 But in today’s 
world, a range of other providers—from Microsoft to startup app companies—
capture, store, and manage health information that can constitute a personal 
health record.342 Indeed, if EHRs were accessible, health care intermediaries 
could combine different sources of data (EHRs and PHRs) to support better 
health care outcomes. To facilitate such a result, however, HHS (or another 
entity) would need to lead an experimental regulatory initiative like those 
outlined above, catalyzing patient access to and control over such information 
and encouraging better cybersecurity practices. As the GAO noted in a different 
report, there is a compelling need to develop a model of “governance and trust 
among [health care] entities . . . to facilitate the sharing of information among 
all participants in an initiative.”343 To date, however, HHS has not taken any 
notable steps to spur such an effort.344 As such, the opportunities to take 
advantage of electronic health information (including enabling artificial 
intelligence and data analytics to improve health care) remain 
underdeveloped.345 
As the earned regulatory model advanced in this Article would predict, other 
agencies in comparable positions to HHS can and do take action to drive multi-
stakeholder processes to enable sharing of information on a secure basis. 
Consider, for example, the case of “Green Button,” a program led by the 
Department of Energy and NIST to enable consumers to gain access to their 
electric usage information based on the Energy Services Provider Interface 
 
339 HEALTH INFO. TECH. POLICY COMM., REPORT TO CONGRESS: CHALLENGES AND 
BARRIERS TO INTEROPERABILITY 12-14 (Dec. 2015), https://www.healthit.gov/facas/sites/ 
faca/files/HITPC_Final_ITF_Report_2015-12-16%20v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/PHU3-RFT 
D]. 
340 Laughlin, supra note 338, at 7. 
341 In particular, HIPAA focuses on “covered entities,” which include health plans and 
health providers who store and transmit health information in electronic form. See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 160.101-03 (2000). 
342 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-817, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS: 
NONFEDERAL EFFORTS TO HELP ACHIEVE HEALTH INFORMATION INTEROPERABILITY 7-10 
(2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672585.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y93Y-MFKN]. 
343 Id. at GAO Highlights. 
344 For thoughts on how such a model could operate, see generally Laughlin, supra note 
338. 
345 See, e.g., STANFORD UNIV., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030, at 26-27 
(2016), https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai_100_report_0831fnl.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/DWU4-B3AG]. 
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(“ESPI”) data standard developed by the North American Energy Standards 
Board (“NAESB”) in early 2012.346 Like in the health care context, such a 
standard must ensure customer privacy and security in their energy usage data. 
Moreover, to be successful, Green Button must drive adoption among a range of 
providers. Over the last several years, it has done so successfully, sponsoring 
“Apps for Energy Challenges” and using the agency’s power to convene, all 
without any specific legislative direction to undertake this initiative.347 
Finally, and consistent with the earned regulatory authority model, Congress 
has noticed HHS’s relative failings and has taken actions to address them. In 
enacting the 21st Century Cures Act, Congress authorized new institutional 
actors to make progress in this area. First, the bill empowers the HHS’s Office 
of the Inspector General “to investigate and establish deterrents to information 
blocking practices that interfere with appropriate sharing of electronic health 
information.”348 Second, it calls for the “[c]onvening [of] existing data sharing 
networks to develop a voluntary model framework and common agreement for 
the secure exchange of health information across existing networks.”349 In short, 
this law shows that where Congress is frustrated by the lack of progress, it can 
and does empower alternative institutional actors to step in. 
IV. TOWARD A THEORY OF AND APPRECIATION FOR POLICY 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
The conventional account of regulatory authority is one where Congress 
grants authority to agencies based on presumed expertise. By contrast, the reality 
of regulatory authority—in a range of contexts, but particularly as to emerging 
technologies—is that it can be earned through experimentation and effective 
administration. This depends on, as Section I.E explained, entrepreneurial 
leadership and a commitment to trial-and-error learning. 
Democratic experimentalism, New Governance, and responsive regulation 
are powerful theories for conceptualizing the modern administrative state and 
how it should operate. Such theories, however, generally assume the presence 
of effective leadership and agency capacity for driving and evaluating 
experiments that happen organically. What these theories miss is that without 
 
346 The Green Button, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/data/green-button 
[https://perma.cc/N8LH-Q7QD] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
347 Id.; Secretary Chu Launches First-Ever “Apps for Energy” Challenge, DEP’T OF 
ENERGY (Mar. 23, 2012), https://energy.gov/articles/secretary-chu-launches-first-ever-apps-
energy-challenge [https://perma.cc/BPP2-CU9N]. 
348 Heather Landi, Senate HELP Committee Passes Health IT Bill, HEALTHCARE 




2017] ENTREPRENEURIAL ADMINISTRATION 2073 
 
the space, incentives, and mandate for such leadership, experimentation will not 
necessarily emerge.350 
Under the earned regulatory authority model, an entrepreneurial approach to 
public policy problem-solving by administrative agencies (or private bodies, for 
that matter) is placed front-and-center and is encouraged by a congressional 
feedback loop.351 Unlike many theories of the administrative state, this model 
does not take the “optimal legal-institutional design . . . as given” or assume “the 
expertise of various possible decisionmakers.”352 Rather, it underscores that the 
incentive for entrepreneurial leadership in government is that agency leaders and 
agencies can maximize their impact by both a willingness to revisit their own 
existing legacy and experiment with innovative regulatory strategies. If those 
strategies succeed, the agencies (and their leaders) are rewarded with more 
formal authority and budgetary support. In this Part, I review the traditional 
skepticism of entrepreneurial leadership and explain why it should become a 
central part of scholarship around the administrative state. 
A. Traditional Public Choice Theory and Critics of the Administrative State 
The Weberian portrait of expert bureaucratic administration and the James-
Landis-New-Deal-era theory of ideal administration faced a withering critique 
in the 1960s and 1970s from the public choice theory of regulation.353 Informed 
 
350 Professor Neal Katyal recognized one aspect of this point in Internal Separation of 
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2325 
(2006) (“Without bureaucratic overlaps, agencies are not pushed to develop innovative ways 
of dealing with problems and may ossify.”). 
351 The importance of such an approach is greatly underappreciated in the public law 
literature. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2252, 
2263-64 (2001) (calling this point “routinely neglected” in legal literature). A number of legal 
scholars have recognized the role of policy entrepreneurship, but that concept tends to be 
applied to elected officials rather than leaders in regulatory agencies. See, e.g., William W. 
Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 54 (2003). 
352 Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 1422, 1425-26 (2012). An important exception is Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 142, 
at 1473 (2014) (discussing criteria for effective agencies and how they can build strong 
brands). A different kind of exception is the argument of then-Professor Kagan, who looked 
at the challenge from the standpoint of the President and focused on the need to bring energy 
and direction to overcome bureaucratic inertia. Kagan, supra note 351, at 2264. Kagan’s 
argument is controversial insofar as it rejects the focus on the agency, which is the entity to 
which Congress has delegated authority. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or “the Decider”? 
The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704-05 (2007) (“[W]here 
Congress has assigned a function to a named agency subject to its oversight and the discipline 
of judicial review, the President’s role—like that of Congress and the courts—is that of 
overseer and not decider.”). 
353 See Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1187 
(1975) (criticizing Landis and acknowledging influence of public choice theory); Richard B. 
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by public choice theory, Professor Louis Jaffe challenged Professor James 
Landis’s defense of the administrative state and concluded that “[o]ne cannot 
expect very much from” the Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”).354 In so doing, 
he overlooked the importance of policy entrepreneurship. 
Jaffe’s prediction about the CAB did not foresee the entrepreneurial 
leadership of former Chair of the Civil Aeronautics Board Alfred Kahn and the 
emergence of a political environment that welcomed reform. In 1977, Kahn took 
over the CAB and demonstrated plainly what entrepreneurial leadership looks 
like.355 Notably, Kahn championed the benefits of his proposed reform program, 
began experimenting with a new model, and effectively built a coalition of those 
willing to reform the regulatory regime.356 Kahn’s reform program started from 
first principles, examined valuable experiments (in particular, the introduction 
of airline competition in California and Texas), and experimented at the federal 
level in a manner that hurt the incumbents and invited entry and innovation into 
the field.357 Kahn’s leadership was, in short, a demonstration of the limits of 
public choice theory.358 
Jaffe also invoked the FTC to support his criticisms of the regulatory state.359 
That agency provides an instructive case study on the importance of 
entrepreneurial leadership. For Jaffe, the FTC was an easy target and a perfect 
case study to demonstrate that Landis—who praised the agency—was off the 
mark.360 By the early 1970s, former FTC Commissioner Phil Elman deemed the 
agency hopeless and concluded that the “best thing to do would be to start all 
 
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1713-15 
(1975) (same). 
354 Jaffe, supra note 353, at 1196-97. Landis’s defense hinged on the value of expertise. 
See JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938). 
355 Philip J. Weiser, Alfred Kahn as a Case Study of a Political Entrepreneur: An Essay in 
Honour of His 90th Birthday, 7 REV. NETWORK ECON. 603, 605 (noting that Kahn went 
against wishes of established firms and pursued deregulatory initiative). 
356 Id. at 607-08. Sheingate offers a similar typology, focusing on the need to (1) define 
problems and shape the agenda for reform, (2) invest resources in generating new ideas and 
institutional strategies, and (3) consolidate innovations into lasting change. Sheingate, supra 
note 111, at 188. 
357 Weiser, supra note 355, at 606-07 (“[Kahn] sought to undermine the traditional 
premises of airline regulation that competition was destructive and should be avoided through 
command and control regulation.”). 
358 There is a painful irony in this story, as Landis had earlier chaired the CAB and had 
failed—on account of public choice pressures—to spur the entry of competition engineered 
by Kahn. See DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 153-54 
(1980). 
359 Jaffe, supra note 353, at 1196 (“The FTC’s uncertain, some-times conflicting, and 
heterogeneous jurisdiction made it an easy target for judicial sabotage.”). 
360 Id. at 1187 (“It is ironic that two of the agencies so much relied on by Landis, the 
Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission, were even when he 
wrote proving to be ineffective . . . .”). 
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over again, abolish the commission and set up a new agency.”361 By the early 
1980s, matters got worse, with one Congressman capturing the negative 
sentiment toward the agency in calling it “a rogue agency gone insane.”362 Based 
on its antipathy to the FTC, Congress passed a special law in 1980 to make it 
harder for the agency to adopt regulations, responding to its earlier, overreaching 
efforts.363 
If one judged Jaffe’s skeptical view of the FTC in the 1970s, one might well 
side with his case against the agency.364 Over the last thirty-five years, however, 
the agency has emerged as a powerful case study for how entrepreneurial 
leadership, flexible experimentation, and capacity-building can pay great 
dividends. Following Bob Pitofsky (who led the development of the online 
privacy framework discussed above), Professor Tim Muris exhibited similar 
entrepreneurial leadership in developing the “Do Not Call List.”365 Through 
such leadership, the agency earned valuable credibility and, in Kovacic’s 
terminology, built its “brand.”366 
A particularly heartening feature of the FTC’s resurgence is that the agency 
is no “one-hit wonder.” Over the last thirty-five years, it has developed the sort 
 
361 NORMAN I. SILBER, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED 368 (2004). 
362 William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of 
Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 590 (1982) (quoting Representative William 
Frenzel). 
363 Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 
374 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012)); Financial Services and Products: The 
Role of the Fed. Trade Commission in Protecting Customers: Hearing on S. 3217 Before the 
Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance of the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Timothy J. 
Muris) (noting that the law followed criticism that FTC sought to be “the second most 
powerful legislature in Washington”). 
364 David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game? Judging 
the FTC’s Critics, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1948, 1952 (2015) (“The conventional wisdom—
which is not entirely mistaken—is that the FTC was the governmental equivalent of a leper 
colony prior to 1969.”). 
365 See The Do Not Call List Authorization: Hearing on H.R. 395 Before the H. Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. 12-32 (2003) (testimony of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, 
Federal Trade Commission); Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition 
Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 168, 177 (2005). 
366 See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 142, at 1472-74. To be sure, once such a culture is 
developed, it drives a virtuous cycle. JENNIFER HOWARD-GRENVILLE, STEPHANIE BERTELS & 
BROOKE BOREN, WHAT REGULATORS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT OUR ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
ii (2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4708-howard-grenvillebertelsboren-ppr-
researchpaper0620 [https://perma.cc/9EGY-2PKJ] (“Cultures that are mindfully managed can 
set organizations apart from their peers in their ability to attract and retain talent, and enable 
organizational adaptation.”). 
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of norm around continuous improvement and reflection discussed above.367 It 
also has shown a willingness to experiment, adhering to FTC Chairwoman 
Maureen Ohlhausen’s maxim that “a leading competition agency like the FTC 
must have the courage to fail from time to time.”368 These results are not an 
accident, but reflect both culture and leadership that encourages consideration 
of alternative ideas.369 As such, the FTC—like the CAB—provides an 
instructive case study of how entrepreneurial leadership can transform an 
administrative agency.370 
B. The Entrepreneurial Leadership and Agency Capacity Research Agenda 
The successes of the CAB and FTC underscore that agencies often enjoy the 
opportunity to make a policy impact through experimentation if they are willing 
to take risks, develop new experiments, and have the capacity to pull them off. 
From Congress’s perspective, it is important that agencies take up this 
opportunity because there is a substantial risk that agencies will stick with 
traditional models when circumstances change and experimentation is called 
for.371 Consequently, when Congress embraces an experiment by specifically 
codifying it, it provides important support and momentum, rewarding the 
agency’s risk in acting and raising the likelihood that the initiative will continue 
to succeed.372 
 
367 See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, How to Measure Success: 
Agency Design and the FTC at 100, at 11 (Nov. 6, 2014) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/d 
ocuments/public_statements/597191/141106ftcat100fallforum.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2LU-
2EDA] (“[The FTC’s design] has afforded the agency . . . the capacity and capability to invest 
in resolving novel competition issues with long-range plans relying on outreach, research, 
advocacy, and enforcement.”); see also Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 142, at 1476 (noting 
that “agency’s attainment of greater capability requires acceptance of a norm that encourages 
agency personnel to self-critically assess both means and ends”). 
368 Ohlhausen, supra note 367, at 11. 
369 HEPBURN, supra note 113, at 17 (“If alternative instruments are to be actively 
considered and used when they are the best option to deal with a policy issue, there needs to 
be a good policy making process in place, supported by information about alternatives 
approaches and their advantages and disadvantages.”). 
370 For another such example, see generally Justin Crowe, The Forging of Judicial 
Autonomy: Political Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of William Howard Taft, 69 J. POL. 
73 (2007). 
371 For Congress, this approach is sensible because it creates incentives for agencies to 
invest in developing the necessary expertise to continue improving the relevant regulatory 
regimes to accomplish their core mission and purposes. See Matthew C. Stephenson, 
Bureaucratic Decision Cost and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 
470 (2007) (explaining once agency expertise is viewed as endogenous to whether Congress 
authorizes agencies to act more broadly, Congress would rationally vest more discretion with 
agencies). 
372 STEVEN KELMAN, UNLEASHING CHANGE: A STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL RENEWAL IN 
GOVERNMENT 137 (2005) (“Legislation thus encouraged the front lines to conclude that 
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A fundamental challenge to an entrepreneurial vision of regulatory innovation 
is that institutional reform does not generally bear immediate results and, to the 
extent it does, it builds on prior leadership that invested in institutional capacity. 
On the legal and bureaucratic front, it is important that agencies are allowed 
some leeway to invest in, and experiment with, institutional reforms.373 On the 
cultural front, the challenge is to select agency leaders willing to build the 
capacity and mindset to experiment and evaluate different policy solutions over 
a time horizon that may well be longer than their term. As former FTC Chairman 
Bill Kovacic and Professor David Hyman explain, the incentives are against 
making such investments and in favor of bringing big regulatory initiatives or 
filing headline-garnering cases.374 Nonetheless, in some cases (like at the FTC), 
agencies have developed a tradition of investing in institutional capacity and 
innovation.375 
For most agency leaders, the challenge of being an entrepreneurial leader and 
creating a culture of innovation is a formidable one.376 At its core, bureaucracy 
is designed to perform in a consistent and reliable manner. In many cases, new 
leaders of administrative agencies are “captured” by the bureaucracy, 
encouraged to accept the traditional modes of operation as a given, and 
discouraged from exercising entrepreneurial leadership and developing 
innovative strategies.377 
 
supporting the reform was safe and that change was ‘for real.’”). 
373 From a positive political theory perspective, agencies have room to experiment 
because, as a practical matter, Congress is unlikely to act to overrule its decisions. See John 
Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 263, 267 (1992) (discussing this point in context of freedom that courts have in 
interpreting statutes, noting “range of choices they can make without fear of legislative 
reaction”). 
374 William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Consume or Invest: What Do/Should Agency 
Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH. L. REV. 295, 296-99 (2016); Muris, supra note 365, at 166 
(“An agency head garners great attention by beginning ‘bold’ initiatives and suing big 
companies. When the bill comes due for the hard work of turning initiatives into successful 
regulation and proving big cases in court, these agency heads are often gone from the public 
stage. Their successors are left either to trim excessive proposals or even to default, with 
possible damage to agency reputation.”). 
375 Kovacic & Hyman, supra note 374, at 318-20 (noting that “[a]s the custom continues 
and becomes deeply ingrained in the agency’s culture over time, it becomes more difficult 
and costly for future leaders to abandon it”). 
376 As Professor Daniel Esty explained: 
Regulatory excellence thus requires that a regulator’s leadership team encourage fresh 
thinking and risk taking at all levels so as to ensure that new approaches will be put 
forward, experimentation undertaken, and better ways of doing business identified. 
Given the prevailing “CYA” attitude of most government workers (who have decades of 
not being rewarded for creativity), innovation will not come easily. 
ESTY, supra note 89, at 7. 
377 Robert Behn tells the story of how a new Commissioner of the Massachusetts 
Department of Revenue, Ira Jackson, upon his appointment, was asked to accept a range of 
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The drive towards predictability is a valuable feature of bureaucracy, as it 
ensures that administration of the law is fair and equal. It is, however, a powerful 
impediment to experimentation and innovation. After all, powerful political 
forces and pressures reinforce bureaucratic inertia, notably because bureaucracy 
and rules provide a ready justification for actions, even if they lead to suboptimal 
results. At the same time, entrepreneurial leaders—who know how and are 
willing to “‘hack’ the system”—can provide guidance, encouragement, and 
political cover for risk-taking and experimentation.378 
The challenge of hacking the system includes the ability to engage front-line 
employees and empower them in efforts directed at experimentation, 
reinvention, and performance improvement.379 In a powerful study of 
entrepreneurial leadership, Steven Kelman, building off his personal experience 
overseeing procurement reform in the 1990s, explains that many agency leaders 
fail to even attempt to introduce real change, do not persist in developing new 
experiments, or are defeated by the perception (or reality) of bureaucratic and 
legal constraints.380 In Kelman’s case, he found that there were a number of 
employees ready to challenge the traditional model and test new models (the 
“change vanguard,” he called them) and that they were waiting for top-line 
leadership to authorize such experiments and engage them.381 In so doing, he 
implemented a version of lean startup, putting into practice “some part of a 
change quickly, rather than studying the idea to death until perfected, and 
mak[ing] corrections along the way.”382 Kelman, in other words, created an 
entrepreneurial network within the overall bureaucratic hierarchy.383 
 
operating procedures and to delegate authority to a set of officials. Robert D. Behn, 
Management by Groping Along, 7 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 643, 643-44 (1988). Rather 
than succumb to this tradition, Jackson resisted such delegations and held long, “exhausting” 
interviews with the relevant officials, seeking to understand how and why they operate the 
way they do. Id. at 644. When appointed agency leaders accede to the legal culture 
(particularly in ways that might run counter to their political charge), that is sometimes called 
“going native.” See Michaels, supra note 9, at 247 (defining “going native” as when agency 
heads are “co-opted by civil servants”). 
378 GEORGETOWN UNIV., supra note 119, at 47 (“Leaders must create the structural 
conditions under which new modes of thinking and creative problem solving are cultivated, 
encouraged, and rewarded.”). 
379 For a discussion of this argument, see Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: 
Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1192 (2016) (“[D]iffering 
institutional responses of frontline officers within distinct agencies and subagencies, and the 
conflicts they create, can generate fruitful arenas for experimentation and policy 
innovation.”). 
380 KELMAN, supra note 372, at 7-16. 
381 Id. at 39. 
382 Id. at 83 (citing Behn, supra note 377). 
383 John Kotter developed a framework for how this can happen in his book, Accelerate, 
explaining that front-line employees rise to the opportunity because “[t]hey appreciate the 
chance to collaborate with a broader array of people than they ever could have worked with 
  
2017] ENTREPRENEURIAL ADMINISTRATION 2079 
 
For successful experiments to stick, and indeed to provide an environment 
where agencies can experiment, agencies must develop the capacity to learn 
from trial-and-error. For agencies to be proactive, they need to foster a learning 
culture. It may well be the relevant culture of the agencies that explain why the 
FTC and NIST were able to successfully develop new initiatives—which 
Congress embraced after the fact—and why HHS has struggled to implement a 
clear mandate. The culture of an agency defines (whether consciously or not) 
how it does things, which can involve an adherence to traditional approaches or 
an openness to trying new things.384 
For leaders to be effective, they must understand and engage effectively with 
the culture of their particular agencies. After all, “if they do not become 
conscious of the cultures in which they are embedded, those cultures will 
manage them.”385 In all cases (and particularly for agencies with an 
underdeveloped learning culture), it is crucial that leaders set the right tone and 
example, “portray[ing] confidence that active problem solving leads to 
learning.”386 Moreover, leaders should be willing to test different “hunches,” 
allowing front-line employees to offer ideas, experiment, and develop 
innovative strategies, and learn from what works as well as what does not.387 
A final related area that has not received the attention it deserves is the 
development of regulatory capacity. It is not an accident, for example, that the 
environmental leadership in California flows from an agency that has built up 
capacity, expertise, and confidence based on successful experimentation.388 As 
Professor Ann Carlson explains, the California Air Resources Board is a case 
study in regulatory capacity building.389 Similarly, over the last thirty-five years 
at the FTC, the effort to build administrative capacity is also an important part 
 
in their regular jobs within the hierarchy.” KOTTER, supra note 91, at 36. 
384 For a classic treatment of organizational culture, see EDGAR H. SCHEIN, 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 18 (4th ed. 2010). 
385 Id. at 22. 
386 Id. at 366. 
387 Behn, supra note 377, at 644; see KOTTER, supra note 91, at 97 (noting need for such 
leadership to elicit ideas from people taught not to speak up). 
388 The importance of regulatory experimentation through entrepreneurial leadership 
applies equally to state and local levels. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Privacy 
Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 760 (2017) 
(discussing impact of state attorneys’ general leadership, using range of tools, in privacy fields 
such as mobile apps). The role of experimentation at those levels is justly celebrated, but the 
importance of the entrepreneurial mindset and methods that can make experimental regulatory 
initiatives successful is generally ignored. 
389 See Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental Leadership: 
California’s Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 63 (2012) (“The state is not 
simply regulating a single product . . . or a particular sector of the economy . . . . Nor is it 
tackling a problem of particular importance to the state . . . . Instead, the effort to regulate 
climate change is truly an economy-wide one.”). 
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of its successes. But past success is no guarantee of continued effectiveness, 
meaning that no agency or initiative can afford to be complacent.390 
CONCLUSION 
As governmental agencies continue to confront new challenges (including 
emerging technologies), it is important to encourage policy innovation and the 
evaluation of experiments on how to address issues ranging from the regulation 
of drones to how to oversee the sharing economy.391 With respect to emerging 
technologies, the pace of technological change and the realities of a global 
marketplace will cut against using traditional command-and-control 
approaches.392 To have the courage to experiment and embrace alternative 
approaches will take entrepreneurial leadership like that displayed by Kahn at 
the CAB and Pitofsky and Muris at the FTC. 
The traditional administrative law model calls on Congress to enact a clearly 
defined, hierarchical regime that empowers a single agency to act, generally by 
rulemaking and adjudication. In reality, agencies and private sector bodies are 
positioned to experiment using a range of approaches other than rulemaking and 
adjudication. When they do so, they develop experience and expertise and build 
(or lose) credibility. In some cases, as with the FTC’s oversight of online privacy 
and data security, the EPA’s development of the Energy Star program, NIST’s 
development of the Cybersecurity Framework, and the MSC’s oversight of 
sustainable fishing, these experimental initiatives are successful and provide 
Congress with a basis for legislation (or obviate the need for legislation). In all 
of these cases, the willingness to experiment, solicit feedback, and adapt is 
critical to public policy problem solving. 
Going forward, Congress is institutionally well-positioned to encourage and 
learn from experiments undertaken by agencies, to recognize where agencies 
can adapt to meet new challenges, and to address the situation where they 
 
390 KELMAN, supra note 372, at 213 (observing that 1990s procurement reform efforts 
suffered setbacks in 2000s, as “the spirit of frontline empowerment and innovation had 
dissipated”). 
391 For a discussion of the regulation of drones, see generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot 
O. Sprague, Drones, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 673 (2015). For a development of a private 
regulatory effort to spur best practice in artificial intelligence, see generally Press Release, 
P’ship on AI, Industry Leaders Establish Partnership on AI Best Practices (Sept. 28, 2016), 
http://www.partnershiponai.org/2016/09/industry-leaders-establish-partnership-on-ai-best-
practices/ [https://perma.cc/Q9JW-SNBR]. 
392 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory 
Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 
44, 87 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (“[W]hen it comes to regulating the 
externalities of transnational production, the state is far from the only game in town, and may 
no longer be the most important game in town.”). 
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cannot.393 Similarly, scholars should no longer ignore why, in some cases, 
initiatives are successful and benefit from entrepreneurial leadership while in 
other cases, they flounder. In so doing, they should evaluate whether, when, and 
why entrepreneurial leadership emerges to drive experiments and how that 
leadership engages with front-line employees and develops agency capacity to 
drive results. With the recent institutional turn in administrative law scholarship, 
there is an increasing receptivity to such inquiries, suggesting that we may well 
be at the dawn of a new era that more seriously considers how agencies operate 
in practice than how judges review their actions.394 
 
393 See Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 369, 414 (2016) (“[S]cholars and policymakers must be willing to entertain the 
prospect of paradigm shifts in both the design of regulatory institutions and the formulation 
of regulatory mandates.”); Weiser, supra note 7, at 720 (“[A]n agency’s institutional process 
is not a black box; rather it is shaped by a series of practices that can be examined, evaluated, 
and potentially changed.”). 
394 If this proves to be the case, it will no longer be true that studies of institutional design 
are “the Rodney Dangerfield of administrative law: [they] get[] no respect.” Hyman & 
Kovacic, supra note 142, at 1516. 
